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PAPER ONE: A LITERATURE REVIEW OF RECIPROCITY AND ITS ROLE IN 
ACCOUNTING LITERATURE 
 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss reciprocity and the role it plays in helping us 
understand interactions between parties in accounting settings. The concept of reciprocity states 
that individuals will reward kind behaviors and punish unkind behaviors. (Fisher et al. 2015; 
Fehr and Gächter 2000; Fehr and Gächter 1997). When trying to trace the origins of the theory of 
reciprocity, it is useful to track the initial constructs on which it is built from various literary 
sources. This process contributes to developing an understanding of how reciprocity is used to 
explain behaviors in the workplace. The notion of reciprocity has a long history and is defined in 
many iterations of social literature dating back to ancient philosophers. Roman politician Cicero, 
for example, stated: “there is no duty more indispensable than that of returning a kindness” and 
“all men distrust one forgetful of a benefit” (Gouldner 1960). This early philosophical sentiment 
exemplifies the integral role positive reciprocity plays in society and the potential avarice an 
individual may encounter when not returning positive actions with displays of positive 
reciprocity.  
Through this review, I gather literature that builds on the concept of reciprocity. I 
organize commonly found themes and organize settings previously used to focus on the multiple 
constructs to build upon reciprocity. 
 
KEYWORDS: Reciprocity, Trust, Distributional Fairness, Intention, Attribution. 
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BACKGROUND AND RECIPROCITY LITERATURE 
Adam Smith (1817) also highlighted the importance of both positive and negative 
reciprocity for a cohesive society. In “The Theory of Moral Sentiments,” Smith describes 
constructs that parallel positive and negative reciprocity in terms of “social passions” and 
“unsocial passions.” Social passions (i.e., positive reciprocity) are noted to be essential for 
harmonious relations in which “mutual regard renders them happy in one another, and sympathy, 
with this mutual regard, makes them agreeable to every other person” (Smith 1817, 47). 
Conversely, unsocial passions (i.e., negative reciprocity) are deemed “necessary parts of the 
character of human nature” because an individual will “become contemptible, who tamely sits 
still, and submits to insults, without attempting either to repel or to revenge them” (Smith 1817, 
45). The latter quote suggests that if one receives acts of ill intention, social culture expects the 
individual to respond in kind (negatively) to counter the social injustice. 
Now that a very brief overview of historical examples of reciprocity is established, the 
remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the following section (II), I briefly contextualize 
reciprocity and its role in business contexts outside the accounting literature, focusing primarily 
on those of economic and management studies, especially those dealing with market exchanges, 
organizational behavior, social contracts, and leader-member exchange (LMX). Last, I review 
and synthesize accounting literature that pertains to each of three dominant dimensions of 
reciprocity: distributional fairness, trust, and intention.  
Reciprocity has been prevalent throughout management and organizational behavior 
literature, especially in the narrower focus of LMX theory (Joseph, Newman, and Sin 2011). 
Much of the focus in this field is on creating measures to predict successful relationship qualities 
between leaders (managers) and followers (employees) within an organization. Then, evaluating 
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qualities that increase subordinate satisfaction, performance, career success, and reduce turnover 
rates are of particular interest (Gerstner and Day 1997; Graen et al. 1982; Dansereau, Alutto, 
Markham, and Dumas 1982; Dansereau, Graen and Haga 1975; Wakabayashi and Graen 1984; 
Vecchio 1982; Bernardin 1987; Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995; Graen, George and Cashman 1975). 
In the commonly used LMX-7 model, seven questions are utilized to determine individuals’ 
perception of the “quality of exchange between supervisors and subordinates” from the 
perspective of both the leader and follower (Scandura and Graen, 1984). In the most rudimentary 
sense, this model attempts to assess levels of mutual trust, respect, loyalty, and subordinate role 
clarity as independent variables to predict dependent output variables. Output variables of 
interest include levels of productivity, job attitude (i.e., subordinate satisfaction), performance 
(i.e., supervisor satisfaction), and perceptions the superior has of the subordinate and vice-versa.  
Previous literature indicates that leaders and members’ perceptions of LMX are 
correlated, and agreement between these parties strengthens over the length of their relationship 
(Gerstner et al. 1997; Sin et al. 2009). This agreement between leaders and members indicates a 
reciprocal tendency, especially when both parties are either pleased or displeased with each 
other. Further, this literature suggests that such reciprocal tenancies compound over time as 
individuals in relationships treat each other either kindly or poorly. 
Much of the theory of intentionality intersects with that of attribution within the 
management literature. This is because intentionality and attribution refer to how an individual 
acts due to a perception that he or she forms of a certain external event. While these two 
dimensions seem to form two sides of the same coin, intentionality refers to assessing 
individuals’ perceptions formed of an outside influence placed on them, while attribution refers 
to an internal influence on some sort of outcome. The theory of intentionality “hypothesizes that 
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a person’s attitude toward an occurrence depends on an individual’s perceptions of how that 
outcome is related to the occurrence of other “more or less preferred consequences.” This theory 
is an early example of how organizations can benefit from creating a “reciprocating 
environment” (Graen 1969, 1). Attribution theory, however, states that positive performance is 
likely to be internalized by an individual and therefore increases the perception that one deserves 
reward as a consequence of satisfactory behavior. Attribution theory predicts that one does not 
attribute unsatisfactory outcomes, such as failure, to oneself. Therefore, individuals may not 
perceive that they deserve negative consequences that result from unsatisfactory outcomes. 
Equity theory predicts that individuals within relationships, such as subordinates and superiors, 
are motivated by the pursuit of fairness. These individuals will likely adjust their contributions 
until an acceptable level of equity is reached. Equity theory is a complementary theory to that of 
instrumentality (Dansereau, Cashman, Graen 1973). Both theories can be used to predict positive 
LMX relationships and costly turnover within an organization.  
RECIPROCITY IN THE BEHAVIORAL ACCOUNTING LITERATURE 
 Reciprocity is defined in this manuscript as the tendency to reward kind actions with kind 
actions and to punish unkind actions with unkind actions. Given this definition, this section 
outlines the theoretical dimensions that underlie varying facets of reciprocity explored in the 
behavioral accounting literature. Specifically, trust, distributional fairness, and intention tend to 
be the most pervasive theories used within the accounting literature to explain and describe how 
reciprocity dictates behavior. Following discussion of these three dimensions, I show that 
reciprocity plays an integral role in negotiation tactics. Table 1.1 shows a collection of works 
discussing general reciprocity in previous literature, and Figure 1 presents a visual representation 
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of the predicted relations between trust, distributional fairness, intention and sensitivity to 
reciprocity. 
[Insert Figure 1 Here]  
[Insert Table 1.1 Here] 
Trust 
 Bradach and Eccles (1989, 104) define trust as “a type of expectation that alleviates the 
fear that one's exchange partner will act opportunistically.” For cooperation between parties to 
exist, trust must be established so parties can exchange in an honest manner (Zaheer et al. 1998; 
Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995). Placed in the context of reciprocity, we expect that honesty 
begets a sense of trustworthiness, and dishonesty begets untrustworthiness (see Table 1.2). 
Similarly, showing trust is expected to beget honest responses, whereas showing distrust would 
elicit dishonest responses. In economic games, a balancing act is played between two parties in 
an exchange. Each party must decide how much to act in a manner that protects its interest from 
a purely economic perspective (e.g., each party must decide whether to show a lack of trust or act 
dishonestly as agency theory would predict). However, potentially negative repercussions could 
develop from overly protecting ones’ economic interest if the other party decides to respond in 
kind. This response in kind is reciprocal behavior. Thus, there is a clear relation between trust 
and honest behavior in the context of reciprocal behavior.  
Lewis and Weigert (1985, 970) state that “trust is characterized by a cognitive leap 
beyond the expectations that reason and experience alone would warrant.” Such an idea of trust 
is contrary to expected behavior stemming from classic economic agency theory, where an 
agent’s utility is assumed to be based on pecuniary incentives (Pepper and Gore 2012). 
Traditional forms of agency theory, however, do not encompass an individual’s innate tendency 
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to behave honestly. Instead, under traditional agency theory, all individuals are primarily 
concerned with self-interest, with little, if any, regard for others. It would, therefore, be a “leap” 
for one party to expect that the other would act in a manner that required a sacrifice of wealth to 
benefit all individuals involved.  
Studies such as Fehr et al. (1999) indicate that individuals show preferences for honesty, 
even when honesty is costly, which is in direct opposition to theories predicting that each player 
in an exchange acts only in a way to increase personal wealth if they have the means to do so. 
Thus, reciprocity can be how an individual acts to increase both parties’ utility. While this may 
sound counter-intuitive, we see the combination of the two schools of thought when we 
encounter studies such as Trivers (1971), which gives insight into “reciprocal altruism,” where 
first movers act in a way in which they expect to increase their economic utility through expected 
return of perceived altruistic behavior. In this sense, we are shown how reciprocity can be parsed 
out from pure altruism (i.e., acts of kindness where there is no expectation of return) in the sense 
that a return of equal or greater value is expected.  
Prior Literature 
Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser (2001) is a seminal study in the 
behavioral/experimental accounting literature that laid the foundation for experimentation 
involving participative budgeting scenarios. In practice, organizations utilize participative 
budgeting to allow managers to act on private information for more efficient processes; however, 
it creates a possibility for managers to act opportunistically. In this experiment, Evans et al. 
(2001) draw from theories including trust, honesty, distributional fairness, and intention to lay 
the groundwork for subsequent behavioral accounting studies. Evans et al. (2001) find evidence 
consistent with the assertion that traditional economic agency theory does not fully explain 
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manager behavior. Specifically, in a trust contract scenario in which managers are able to take 
full economic advantage of private information they possess, participants showed honesty 
preferences, even in the absence of repercussions for acting in a dishonest manner. While 
explanations beyond preferences for honesty were not explicitly discussed, the study opened a 
door for future exploration utilizing this trust contract as a base control for experiments.  
While behavioral results found by Evans could be classified as altruistic behavior, as 
there was no potential for another party to respond in kind, subsequent studies modified the 
Evans et al. (2001) setting to include strategic interaction (for a discussion of this literature, see 
Brink, Coats, and Rankin, 2018). In this setting, reciprocal behavior became possible. 
Specifically, negative reciprocal behavior could occur where a perceived lack of trust causes an 
increase in dishonest behavior. For example, subsequent studies (Antle and Eppen 1985) placed 
participants in hurdle contracts setting (i.e., they were restricted in that they only attained a 
certain percentage of the overall slack available). In these settings, the decision was no longer an 
entirely ethical dilemma regarding how much a subordinate was willing to keep. Rather, the 
implementation of a hurdle has been interpreted as a sign of negative trust shown by the superior 
enforcing it as a control. Because of this shift in focus from one of ethical consideration, 
subordinates under this control were shown to adjust their behavior to wealth-creating activity, 
rather than the previous trust scenario in which they showed greater levels of honesty in their 
reporting (Evans et al. 2001). 
Rankin (2008) shows a stark effect of trust being given to a subordinate to report 
factually. It is shown that when there is an ethical dilemma, i.e., subordinates must confirm 
having reported honestly, the focus on honesty and the negative utility from acting otherwise is 
taken into consideration and affects their decision making. However, in a situation in which trust 
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is removed from subordinates, i.e., a scenario in which the superior has final authority, the focus 
on a potential ethical dilemma is removed from their decision in a way that causes them not to 
change their levels of honesty regardless of whether they must confirm that they acted honestly.  
LMX literature suggests that reciprocal behavior also has a tendency to become 
magnified over time as negative actions are met with negative reactions, and positive actions are 
responded with positive reactions. Fisher, Peffer, Sprinkle and Williamson (2015) designed a 
trust game experiment in which a superior requested effort and the subordinate responded with a 
willingness to provide a certain level of effort. Higher expectations of effort were predicted to 
induce feelings of negative reciprocity, much like tightening a control. Because of this potential 
negative reaction from subordinates, the results indicated that superiors altered their strategies 
over time in a manner consistent with realizing that demanding too much effort would induce 
negative reciprocity. This is consistent with a strategy a manager would use to induce trust with 
subordinates. Subordinates responded to reduced effort demands with positive reciprocity in the 
form of higher levels of effort.  
 Building trust between employees can also be a determinate of organizational success. 
Coletti et al. (2005) found that control systems have the potential to induce cooperative behavior 
between employees. Even more interesting, Coletti found that while it was expected that external 
observations participants’ cooperative behavior would be altered by the knowledge that 
participants were under the control to induce cooperation and would view positively cooperative 
behavior as less inherently trustworthy than would participants who cooperated without some 
outside control leading to such behavior, no significant difference was found. This implies that 
cooperation is viewed as an indication of trust whether it was influenced by an outside source or 
not.  
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While reciprocity can be easily identified in literature exploring interactions between 
parties in managerial accounting and auditing, applications in financial accounting are not, as 
accounting decisions are numerous and may not always be immediately identifiable. However, 
reciprocity is likely to have implications for responses to firm actions such as investor reactions 
to corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Kim et al.2012). Many companies are now expected to 
engage in CSR activity to build trust with their investors, often in the form of improving either 
the community in which they do business, the environment, or other forms of philanthropy1. If 
they do not engage in such activity, it is possible that the market will see this as a lack of trust-
building and retaliate by lowering the perceived value of such firms. Further, reciprocity may 
play a role in describing how stakeholders respond to top management. For example, 
stakeholders may respond reciprocally to management engaging in underhanded activity or 
deception.  
  Another interaction in which we see trust and subsequent reciprocity at work is between 
top managers and analyst engagement. Analysts provide valuations of a company and estimates 
of future profitability. If this information is reliable, investors are able to trust analysts and return 
to them for continued forecasts (Brown et al. 2015). However, to keep a step ahead of their 
competition, analysts must garner information not yet available to the public. To do so, they must 
often curry favor from top management to obtain privately held information (Ke and Yu 2006). 
As a result, there is a potential for analysts’ information to be subject to misrepresentation or 
bias. Typically, top managers’ desire to either meet or beat expectations derived from analysts’ 
forecasts through various means of manipulations through guidance (Ito et al. 1998; Richardson 
                                                          
6 “The distribution of wealth is a comparison of the wealth of various members or groups in a society” 
7 For the purpose of this manuscript wealth is defined as any utility increasing proxy, be it monetary, effort, or 
otherwise. 
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et al. 2004; Bartov et al. 2002; Matsumoto 2002; Kothari 2009). Analysts may wish to stay in 
favor with top management, and top managers may desire to keep a positive public financial 
image. As a result, a reciprocal relationship may be created in which top managers are more 
willing to share private information with those analysts who assist management in guiding the 
market in a way that is favorable in the public eye (Ho et al. 2018; Mayhew 2008; Westphal 
2008). Further, top management may punish analysts who downgrade their firm’s stock 
recommendations (Mayhew 2008; Westphal 2008). This reciprocal relationship between analysts 
and top management is so strong that it has even been shown that analysts will go so far as to 
“migrate” with a manager if they move to another firm (Brochet et al. 2010).2 Table 1.2 shows a 
collection of works discussing the dimension of trust and its role in reciprocity previously 
researched. 
[Insert Table 1.2 Here] 
Distributional Fairness  
 Distributional fairness, sometimes also referred to as distributive justice, is generally 
defined as the perception that participants within either a single or series of interactions show 
preference in creating an overall state of relative equality. Individuals often act in a manner that 
shows a preference for fairness in a distribution for various forms of utility, be it that of wealth, 
resources, or effort. This behavior is expected for participants on either side of the equilibrium 
scale; for example, individuals may give their wealth to others in an attempt to create a state of 
distributional equilibrium. Akerlof (1982), Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990), and Messick and 
Sentis (1983) indicate that preference for fairness is a construct independent of acts of fairness; 
                                                          
8 Dictator games commonly give a single individual power over the distribution of wealth in a way that they are 
initially endowed with a greater deal of wealth. 
A VIEW INTO RECIPROCITY – Green 2019 
 
15 
 
individuals may also use destructive acts to balance the scales. In other words, individuals’ 
inclination for fairness is often counter to both their own preferences for wealth creation and 
those they are responding to, again indicating behavior contrary to traditional economic agency 
theory. 
Literature shows that perceptions of distributional fairness can lead to reciprocal 
behavior. Rabin (1993), provides a tie between distributional fairness and reciprocity by 
demonstrating that individuals are more likely to engage in activities that restore a feeling of 
equilibrium depending on their state emotion. For example, if a company acts in a monopolistic 
manner, a consumer in the economy may be less likely to purchase services from that company 
(Fehr et al. 1998; Rabin 1993). Similarly, if union members feel they are being treated unfairly, 
they are more likely to go on strike to punish their employer. This is often true even if a strike 
entails the loss of current income for the employees (damaging their wealth), which contrasts 
with the expectation of wealth maximization from traditional economic theory. With these two 
examples, we see that individuals are likely to give up wealth to both help and harm others to 
restore equity.   
Prior Literature 
A model utilized in Douthit and Stevens (2014) was designed to manipulate individuals’ 
perceptions of distributional fairness. In this, a manipulation of the salience of distributional 
fairness (i.e., pay disparity between subordinate and superior) was either public or private 
information. For those in a manipulation in which the subordinate felt there was a lack of 
distributional fairness (i.e., the salience of disparity of income received by the subordinate 
compared to that of their superior), subordinates responded with lower levels of honesty in the 
form of increased budgetary slack during participative budgeting exchange rounds.  
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 Contract designs between organizations and their employees also play an integral role in 
affecting reciprocity. In the sense of agency theory, organizations seek contract designs that take 
advantage of their specific market (Baiman 1982). More specifically, classic agency theory states 
that the goal of “optimal agency contracts” for an organization would be to “maximize firm 
profit, taking into account employees’ rationality and incentive compatibility constraints” 
(Kuang 2009, 2011). In this vein of research, however, optimal agency contracts are largely met 
with negative reciprocity from those offered such contracts. Further, while in scenarios of 
participative salary negotiation under an output-based contract, i.e., basing employees’ salary on 
the amount of additional utility provided to the organization, potential new employees are able to 
make a counteroffer for the rate they will be paid for their efforts. Clearly, superiors have more 
negotiating power than do subordinates, and this is met with feelings of negative reciprocity 
(Kuang 2011). Potentially worse, newly hired subordinates can be left with the perception that 
their negotiation ability was actually “pseudo participative” in that they never had any real say in 
the matter of their salary. Collectively, these perceptions are primarily due to the feeling of being 
sold short for the effort an individual has put forward (i.e., the company offering the minimum 
for the maximum effort requested). Therefore, organizations can be more effective when 
designing contracts that consider both financial and nonfinancial benefits/detriments caused by 
certain contract structures, such as costs of the actual salary and potential lower future employee 
efforts. Organizations could then utilize reciprocity-based contracts to increase subordinates’ 
subsequent level of effort, increasing firms’ overall profits. (Hannan 2005; Kuang 2009; Sprinkle 
2003; Bonner et al. 2000).  
Reciprocity has a considerable role in contract design related to individuals’ expectations 
that must be fulfilled. This sense of entitlement was shown previously where participants exhibit 
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higher levels of effort for higher wages, which is logical, however, the consideration of relative 
cost to additional input received by the organization was not initially considered. Therefore, the 
salience of the gift (additional wages) was shown to play an integral role in employees’ sense of 
reciprocity and its true ability to affect an employee’s output (Hannan, Kagel, and Moser 2002).  
While a majority of the accounting literature on distributional fairness attends to 
interactions with is a direct exchange of wealth between individuals in the sense that as one 
party’s wealth increases/decreases, the second party moves in the opposite direction, third parties 
(i.e., observers of behavior) are also found to be subject to distributional fairness preferences. 
Maas (2012), for example, shows that managers can act as third parties by allocating wealth 
between multiple employees. Because supplemental information gathering depletes managers’ 
resources, they may be unlikely to seek additional information on individual employees’ efforts 
toward a team’s overall performance. However, Maas showed that managers are compelled to 
seek out costly information to ensure that employees’ efforts are rewarded fairly. A potential 
implication of this is a manager’s desire to increase each employee’s efforts for improved future 
performance of the team.  
In addition to an individual’s innate sense of preference for distributional fairness, it has 
been shown that encouraging individuals to be mindful of fairness (causing a higher level of 
salience of such equilibrium) when brainstorming a bargaining strategy can increase the 
likelihood they will act in a cooperative manner. Maxwell et al. (1999) found that buyers who 
were encouraged to consider fairness in this manner responded by shifting the focus of their 
decision from themselves to what would potentially be fairer for the seller. In a later study 
(Maxwell et al. 2003), the seller in a similar negotiation failed to reciprocate fair behavior. In 
response, buyers responded with reduced levels of cooperation and seemingly vindictive 
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behavior. These studies illustrate that negative reciprocity can occur within interactions to the 
detriment of both parties when they do not act to maintain distributional fairness.  
Direction for Future Research 
Contract settings seem of particular interest especially now (NLRA or the Act; 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 151-169 [Title 29, Chapter 7, Subchapter II, United States Code] Messina 2012). This 
salience of cross-distributional fairness could be of interest, as most of the research has been 
focused on that of the interaction between a manager and employee’s compensation, control of 
compensation, negotiation, and saliency. However, utilizing a horizontal manipulation, i.e., 
between employees, especially in the form of saliency of the level of distributional fairness, may 
play on the effort levels of an employee. Table 1.3 shows a collection of works discussinglists 
notable research in the dimensionfield of distributional fairness and its role in reciprocity 
previously researched. 
[Insert Table 1.3 Here] 
Intention 
Intentionality “is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to 
stand for, things, properties and states of affairs” (Jacob 2019). Intentionality indicates that 
organizations can benefit from creating a “reciprocating environment” (Graen 1969, 1). This, 
however, was not always considered the case. In the early 1990s, much of the economic 
literature asserted that, except true altruism, acts of selflessness do not have a logical place in 
predicting a player’s behavior in economic games. If an individual engages in behavior that is 
beneficial to another individual without expected recourse of positive return or investment of 
either effort or wealth, that behavior largely departs from simple individual wealth creation 
expected in early economic theory (Rabin 1993).  
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Intention we see in literature as individuals’ perception of activity, external from their 
locus of control that affects individuals’ in either a positive (trust) or negative (distrust) light 
(Enzle and Anderson 1993). Because this is a matter of the individual’s perception of the 
underlying reason behind another’s activity, rather than objective reasoning, the salience of such 
activity and source becomes paramount as to how the outside action is perceived. For example, a 
company may implement a control over its employees to restrict certain behavior. If both are 
made aware of such an action (increased salience) and they can directly identify the source, as 
,for example, originating from their superior, they may perceive this as a signal of lack of trust. 
This negative perception may, in turn, be responded to with negative reciprocity in which 
subordinates respond in kind with negative and potentially destructive behavior (Christ 2013).  
Prior Literature 
A key to any organization’s overall success rests in the ability of its members to 
cooperate to achieve the maximum output for all those involved. In seminal research, such as 
Nash Equilibrium scenarios, we see that the greatest output for all players is typically not in 
favor of an individual’s maximum potential output. To nurture this cooperation, it has been 
found that trust is critical (Coletti et al. 2005; Zaheer et al. 1998; Zaheer and Venkatraman 
1995). While managers are often tempted to relieve woes of agency issues by implementing 
controls, they must ensure that controls are implemented carefully to foster an environment of 
cooperation. In managerial accounting studies, we are tasked with exploring potential factors 
may change an individual’s behavior in a way that is both cost-effective and psychologically 
effective (Christ 2008). One area in which this occurs is within formal controls that can be 
imposed by an overseeing element, such as an organization or individual in a superior role. 
Christ (2008) organizes these formal controls into three categories: “behavior,” “output,” and 
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“inspection.” “Behavior” represents a superior’s direct oversight of a worker’s activities. 
“Output” focuses on how such controls affect performance measurements after a formal control 
has been put into place. Finally, “inspection” of the controls themselves deals primarily with 
accounting and financial reporting, as well as billing and asset security.  
Behavior controls are input through direct surveillance of individuals’ activities. They are 
likely most relatable to experiments conducted in managerial accounting research, such as Christ 
(2013) and Christ and Vance (2017). In these studies, participants are subjected to varying levels 
of intrusiveness, primarily manipulated by the salience of the source of the control exogenous 
(i.e., the control’s origin is ambiguous) or endogenous (i.e., the control is directly imposed by a 
superior). In these studies, the expectation is that there will be incrementally larger negative 
reactions from subordinates as the level of intrusiveness or valence of control implemented by 
the superior increases. 
Second, output controls are regularly examined in managerial research, particularly in 
participative budgeting where superiors are able to review subordinates’ performance and 
respond according to their performance assessments (largely measured by the effort given toward 
their task). Within this type of research, we see a variance in behavior of superiors who are given 
the ability to implement different methods of controls. Bonus contracts, such as those used in 
Christ (2012), encourage positive reciprocity and are effective for increasing measures of both 
cost benefit to the organization and psychological utility for the subordinate. Conversely, when 
managers are endowed with the ability to punish, subordinates tend to respond negatively. Thus, 
while the use of control instruments may be shown to be monetarily effective within some 
studies, Christ (2012) shows that there are cases in which subordinates’ psychological utility is 
lowered so significantly that it is a detriment to the firm’s success. Penalty contracts can be so 
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harmful to relationship qualities between managers and subordinates that subordinates go so far 
as to not only withhold effort to help but increase effort to punish the manager Christ (2018).  
Several participative budgeting studies further explore these phenomena by utilizing 
various manipulations to elicit feelings of either negative or positive reciprocity that could be 
found in practical settings. In Christ (2013), reciprocity was manipulated by adjusting 
employees’ beliefs about management’s intentions signaled by the source of control imposed. 
When subordinates were able to identify the source of control as that of their direct superior, they 
perceived such constraints as a signal of lower trust imparted by their superiors. This, in turn, 
caused subordinates to respond with lower effort. 
Largely, accounting literature suggests that implementing controls over subordinates 
lowers overall budgetary slack (Douthit and Stevens 2014; Schatzberg and Stevens 2008) (see 
Table 1.4). However, such controls have the potential to reframe the participative budgeting 
scenario from an ethical dilemma where they are primarily motivated by honesty to one of a 
strategic interaction where they may be motivated by pecuniary concerns (Brink et al. 2018). In 
the case of Rankin et al. (2008) for example, when subordinates have the final say in a 
negotiation and must give a confirmation that they have acted in an honest manner, slack is 
significantly decreased. However, slack is not shown to change from this ethical confirmation 
when the final authorization authority is given to their superior. Rankin et al. (2008) illustrate 
that controls may have unintended consequences. 
Christ (2013) showed that a when a superior imposes a direct control over a subordinate, 
the subordinate may respond with negative reciprocity. Specifically, if subordinates perceive that 
the control is directly implemented by their superior, they will likely perceive this as a signal of 
distrust and respond with negative reciprocity (costly/destructive behavior), whereas if the 
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control is ambiguous, they may not form this perception and not retaliate. In short, the social 
costs may not be worth the expected monetary benefits of the control particularly, if subordinates 
would act within a reasonable level of honesty in the absence of the formal control.  
Intentions can also be gleaned from the context of the scenario setting. Choi (2013) 
demonstrated such contextual effects in an experimental setting where labor markets were 
manipulated to see if individuals’ perceptions of a signing bonus when offered a contract were 
adjusted by the environment. More specifically it was sought if varying conditions could alter a 
potential new hires perception of a bonus offer as either that of an organization’s gesture of good 
faith or simply necessity to attain a new hire. In instances of surplus labor markets (i.e., labor 
markets with an excess of jobseekers), individuals perceived a signing bonus as an act of good 
will and reciprocated with increased levels of effort. However, in labor markets with an excess of 
jobs positions, individuals felt entitled to such a reward and did not reciprocate with increased 
levels of effort. 
Direction for Future Research 
 Intention is a unique dimension of reciprocity in that it is a perception of an interaction 
between two parties and the underlying tone one believes another’s actions imply. While at the 
root of much research we see that actions like implementing controls on an individual, for 
example, can cause an individual to feel negative reciprocity, it is possible that individual traits 
can cause individuals to have varying levels of sensitivity to reciprocity. For example, if an 
organization implements a control over an individual’s processes, one who is sensitive to 
reciprocity may see this as indicating that the organization does not trust the individual and may 
respond in a destructive manner. However, an individual who is not sensitive to reciprocity may 
perceive this merely as an initiative for the organization to become more efficient for the overall 
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good of the company. Creating a measure to examine individual differences in sensitivity to 
reciprocity, then testing such manipulations previously used, may provide more insight regarding 
whether specific strategies of implementing such controls may be more effective than others.  
 Uncertainty is also an interesting aspect of intention of another’s actions (Douthit & 
Stevens 2014, Brink, Green, and Kearney 2018). While ambiguous controls have a varying effect 
over employees, this is a point of interest of further research to properly vet the implication of 
controls utilized within an organization. Christ (2013) also demonstrates that the source of 
control can dictate the reaction, i.e., reciprocal behavior one responds with. Table 1.4 shows a 
collection of works discussing the dimension of intention and its role in reciprocity previously 
researched. 
[Insert Table 1.4 Here] 
Attribution 
 Attribution theory has deep seeded roots in psychology history. Seminal work, such as 
Freud (1894) describes an individuals’ ego and its ability to reject “unbearable ideas” that may 
serve as a negative affect to ones’ self’, more simply stated, individuals have the tendency to not 
have the ability to see objectively assess traits or events that cause them to feel as though they 
have faults. Langer (1975) introduced the theory of the “illusion of control” in which one 
attributes successes to their own action/abilities even in a scenario in which their success is 
determined entirely by chance. These two sides of the theoretical coin form the basic construct of 
attribution theory, in which an individual expects to attribute success to ones’ own accord, and 
attribute a failure (i.e. stain on one’s ego) to external sources, or at least to causes that are not of 
their own making.  
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 When addressing the construct of attribution and its relation to reciprocity, it is likely 
most pertinent to explore ways in attribution affects interpersonal relationships. Many early 
experiments show evidence for individuals largely possessing an “egocentric bias” in which they 
overly attribute their own contribution in a collaborative relationship when there is an overall 
successful outcome rather than a failure (Ross and Sicoly 1979; Thompson and Kelley 1981). 
This “egocentric bias” is often measured from the perspective of an individual’s ability to form 
an objective perspective on their individual contribution in relationship to the group level 
outcome. (Ross and Sicoly. 1979; Rather and Heskowitz 1977). Having this uneven sense of 
contribution towards success or failure causes individuals then to either believe that success is 
attributed to their ability (Langer 1975), and therefore would likely cause the individual to feel 
that they should either be recognized or rewarded for such. Conversely failure is not associated 
to their efforts but rather an outside source and they should not receive punishment (Bartling and 
Fishbacher 2011).  
 Attribution theory also takes a significant place in contractual agreements between parties 
in which individuals believe that they feel entitled to specific rewards. Individuals assume that 
their contributions lead to the group success, whether actual success arose from their own ability, 
or merely success of the organization as a whole. Additionally, on the negative end of the 
spectrum we see that individuals typically do not believe that they should receive punishment 
despite potential responsibility for failure (Harvey and Weary 1984; Christ, Sedatole, and Towry 
2012; Smith 1759; Greenwald 1980). Table 1.5 shows a collection of works discussing the 
dimension of attribution and its role in reciprocity previously researched. 
[Insert Table 1.5 Here] 
A VIEW INTO RECIPROCITY – Green 2019 
 
25 
 
Reciprocity and its Role in Negotiation 
 Reciprocity plays a unique role in accounting literature where negotiation strategies must 
be evaluated for effectiveness. Audit literature is of particular interest, as auditors must negotiate 
revisions with clients in a manner that allows them to maintain professional integrity while 
retaining a client’s favor. While Shaub (1996) conjectures that one of the primary dimensions of 
reciprocity (trust) is a “threat” to an auditors’ independence, it has been shown that building a 
reciprocal relationship can be a tactic employed by auditors to reach a successful outcome while 
retaining professional integrity in the form of offering concessions and working collaboratively.  
Early works have shown that specific negotiator style can create environments that are 
either conducive to cooperation or non-collaborative. Druckman (1967) illustrated that dyadic 
behavior has a substantial effect in situations of collective bargaining. Individuals predisposed to 
strategy before entering a bargaining situation are found to be more hardened in their resolve and 
therefore less likely to act as a collective. Conversely, individuals who engage in collective 
behavior, such as information sharing rather than competitive behavior, are more likely to be met 
with positive reciprocity in decision making, leading to a greater chance of concessions between 
parties (Putnam 1990).  
Prior Literature 
In the context of client-auditor negotiations, reciprocity plays a key role in determining 
concessions. While auditors, by nature, tend to be more conservative when making decisions, 
reciprocity takes hold when multiple subsequent accounting issues are brought to light 
throughout an audit engagement, a collection of previous works have been compiled in Table 
1.6. (Gibbins et al. 2001). Reciprocity suggests that one party will make concessions when a 
second party acts in kind (Gouldner 1960). Therefore, resolutions on previous issues between the 
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client and auditor may affect their subsequent interactions (Hatfield and Mullis 2015; Gibbins et 
al. 2001). Due to the negotiation aspect of client-auditor relations, reciprocity may be a strategy 
for auditors to implement when attempting to reach resolutions that do not damage 
professionalism while maintaining positive relations with their client. For example, Sanchez et 
al. (2007) explored a “concession approach,” where they were able to show the effectiveness of a 
negotiation strategy in which the auditor made salient their concessions of inconsequential items 
found during the audit engagement. These concessions, in turn, created a perception of positive 
reciprocity between the auditor and the client which was returned by an increased likelihood of 
the client posting more significant income decreasing adjustments while at the same time 
preserving positive customer relations.  
Research such as Hatfield and Mullis (2015) may be a fruitful stepping point to tie in 
with research involving investor reactions. Certainly, auditor concessions aid in more 
trustworthy decisions by investors where adjustments are not needed. This waterfall effect of 
auditor trust leading to investor trust would be an interval study that could improve the scope of 
not only accounting research but also finance and economics.  
  Collaborative actions are also found to be more likely to meet with concession (Pruitt and 
Carnevale 1993; Druckman 1967). Therefore, it is beneficial for auditors to take advantage of 
reciprocity-based strategies to more easily reach agreement during the negotiation phase of an 
audit engagement (Hatfield et al. 2008), especially where both parties have the tendency to feel a 
sense of a win-lose outcome, i.e., there are no outcomes possible in which both parties are able to 
mutually benefit (Putnam 1990). While this collaborative strategy has shown to effectively 
improve negotiations between clients and auditors, in a scenario in which a client acts in a 
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contentious (i.e., non-reciprocal) manner, an auditor’s experience is able to mediate negotiations 
where reciprocity does not prevail (Fu et al. 2011).  
Reciprocity-based audit negotiation strategies, such as the concession approach, seem to 
be a direct result of the regulatory environment created by SAS No. 89 (AICPA [1999]) and 
Sarbanes-Oxley, which allow for both concession and no-concession approaches to fall under 
compliant reporting. This indicates that regulators were able to see the benefits of creating an 
atmosphere in which auditors and clients could work in an environment which fosters positive 
reciprocity and subsequent cooperation in situations where auditors deem concession items to be 
inconsequential, while retaining the ability to preserve professional integrity.  
While in many cases trust is seen as a catalyst for positive reciprocity, auditors must be 
vigilant regarding the potential for fraud. As relationships between auditors and clients lengthen 
over time, concerns arise as to auditors’ ability to maintain professional skepticism (Kerler and 
Killough 2009). However, while auditors increase their levels of trust for their clients, this does 
not seem to affect an auditor’s skepticism; further, auditors with increased experience and 
training are able to temper their levels of trust given to employees (Shaub 1996). Hatfield (2010) 
shows evidence of this in that previous concessions made by clients create feelings of reciprocity 
with their auditor, shaping the outcome of current-period negotiations tilting final decisions in 
favor of the client.  
Direction for Future Research 
 Much of the research involving the role of reciprocity within negotiations involves 
experiments that employ a single-round decision. This may not fully reflect how reciprocity 
takes place during the relationship between an audit firm and its client, as many of these 
relationships last over many years. It may, therefore, be of interest to utilize a repeated-round 
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engagement to see the effects of time over the relationship. Not only could we examine whether 
engagement pairs become more collaborative or potentially contentious over engagements, also 
to what extent a relationship can be contentious before terminating the engagement. Another 
potential area of research could stem from auditor rotation rules. Potentially, a change from an 
auditor-client relation from one that is reciprocal in nature to one that is not could have adverse 
effects or vice-versa. Table 1.6 shows a collection of works discussing the dimension of 
reciprocity and its role in economic negotiation previously researched. 
[Insert Table 1.6 Here] 
CONCLUSION 
 In each field of behavioral accounting research, we see that reciprocity is utilized in 
multiple fashions. Reciprocity could increase productivity, honesty, and trust as we see in 
management studies. Reciprocity is also a potentially useful tool for assisting in negotiations. 
Auditors are likely to foster positive reciprocity to complete their responsibilities better. 
However, reciprocity may have dangerous effects if used to facilitate practices that are not 
ethical or in the best interest of a firm’s stakeholders, such as what might occur when auditors or 
managers allow so much trust that they are taken advantage of. While trust contracts in 
participative budgeting can potentially provide accurate and timely information, agency theory 
prevails to a certain extent, although individuals tend to not take advantage of private 
information. Likewise, while showing signs of trust is viewed as a detriment to auditors’ 
independence, reciprocal behavior can allow them to better perform a successful audit 
engagement. 
 Because of these various interaction styles and implications dependent on each form of 
relationship, we must understand how reciprocity plays a role in the accounting literature. As 
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highlighted throughout this paper, many unanswered questions remain. This paper serves as a 
spotlight of where we have been, where we are now, and where we need to reach toward for 
future research in reciprocity and its role in accounting literature. 
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PAPER TWO: DEVELOPMENT OF A SCALE TO MEASURE SENSITIVITY TO 
RECIPROCITY 
 
ABSTRACT 
 The concept of “reciprocity” states that individuals will reward kind behaviors and punish 
unkind behaviors. This paper examines reciprocity as a multidimensional trait in which 
individuals possess varying levels of sensitivity. I hypothesize that reciprocity can be observed as 
a trait condition (stable throughout time) as well as a state condition (one that is enacted due to a 
momentary stimulus). Furthermore, individual dimensions of reciprocity are measurable and 
vary across individuals, and they may provide predictable behavioral responses. Prior accounting 
research has primarily focused on the overall effects of state-induced conditions through varying 
external influence. This dissertation attempts to develop a measure of reciprocity, using three 
behavioral dimensions: preferences for distributional fairness, perceptions of trust between 
parties, and perceptions of the intention underlying another’s actions.  
 I first developed a survey to measure an individual’s sensitivity to reciprocity by 
utilizing the three above dimensions underlying reciprocal actions. Multiple survey samples were 
used to create a final 14-item scale to measure an individual’s sensitivity to reciprocity. 
However, the fit indices for this model did not meet desired levels of goodness of fit. Further, 
this model did not exhibit predictive ability in an economic setting. I end this dissertation with a 
discussion of potential implications for future research and describe how this may open a 
conversation into furthering our understanding of the theory of reciprocity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of “reciprocity” states that individuals will reward kind behaviors and punish 
unkind behaviors (Falk and Fischbacher 2006). While reciprocity suggests that individuals 
evaluate kind actions, they also consider the underlying intentions of the action. Prior behavioral 
studies have observed reciprocity through the implementation of numerous manipulations, 
varying in both methodologies and theoretical underpinnings. Generally, these studies have 
attempted to explain the causes of positive or negative behavior between subordinates and 
superiors. Due to variations in the independent variables previously manipulated, it is possible to 
extend prior reciprocity research. I propose that due to various manipulations used, there is an 
inherent motivation to examine the effects of three major behavioral dimensions identified in 
prior reciprocal behavior studies within an accounting setting. Previous literature finds that 
varying levels of reciprocal reactions are dependent on the utilized experimental manipulations 
(Christ 2013; Fisher et al. 2015; Davidson 2013). This paper extends prior research by 
attempting to develop a measure of sensitivity to reciprocity, using three behavioral dimensions 
that may predict the strength of a behavior response. These dimensions include preferences for 
distributional fairness, perceptions of trust between parties, and perceptions of the intention 
underlying another’s actions. Therefore, I examine individuals’ varying levels of reciprocal 
response to interactions. These interactions often take place in principal-agent scenarios when an 
organization attempts to either control destructive behavior or induce positive behavior34. This 
                                                          
3 Principal agent scenarios occur when an agent makes decisions on behalf of their principal. It is expected that the 
agent will make decisions in the best interest of the principal. With inherent information asymmetry, agents are in 
the position of making decisions that benefit their own wealth at the detriment of the principal. Often these scenarios 
also use participant titles such as superior and subordinate, or manager and employee interchangeably. 
4 Often seen through dependent measures of levels of a subordinate’s effort or honesty, and a manager’s likelihood 
to impose a control. 
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study could become a useful tool for future experimentation dealing with reciprocal behavior, not 
only when examining new, unique experimental manipulations such as fairness, lack of trust, or 
perceived intention, but also, the potential for replicating previous studies to glean more 
information about participants’ reactions. 
An organization may run more efficiently when superiors are able to delegate decisions 
to their subordinates. A primary purpose of delegation is to take advantage of subordinates’ 
ability to act swiftly and utilize their specialized knowledge due to the proximity to the decision. 
For example, when organizations use participative budgeting practices, where granular 
information is required, a subordinate’s role may put them in a better position to make successful 
decisions (Rankin et al. 2008). These practices assume that the organization can place a 
reasonable level of trust in those making efficient local budget decisions. While the practice of 
participative budgeting aids many organizations, the potential for information asymmetry 
(information possessed by subordinates that is not readily available to their superior), allows 
subordinates to benefit by taking advantage of the potential information asymmetry (Dufwenberg 
and Kirchsteiger 2004; Stevens and Thevaranjan 2010; Pepper and Gore 2015).  
While organizations and those in superior roles are widely known to implement controls 
as a measure to prevent a subordinate from engaging in devious behavior (Zimmerman 2006), 
previous literature finds tension when examining the overall benefits of controls (Christ 2013; 
Christ et al. 2008; Rankin et al. 2008; Coletti, Sedatol and Towry 2005). Additionally, a growing 
body of research has investigated potential detriments arising from subordinates acting on their 
perceptions of “why controls are implemented” and the “source of implementation.” This 
perception of source and purpose can lead to a subordinate’s feeling of either positive or negative 
reciprocity induced by a superior implementing controls (Falk and Kossel 2006; Christ et al. 
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2008). Prior reciprocity studies have shown that individuals respond to kind acts with kind 
behavior, and conversely, individuals respond to unkind acts with unkind behavior (Fisher et al. 
2015; Fehr and Gachter 1998, 2000; Fehr, Ernst, and Gachter 2002). Under the concept of 
reciprocity, controls implemented by superiors intending to inhibit negative behavior may induce 
negative reactions from those who feel they are under scrutiny. For example, superiors may 
implement controls to limit subordinates’ ability to report budget expectations in excess of actual 
predicted or known budget requirements (i.e., to limit budgetary slack).5 Subordinates may 
perceive controls in this setting as the superior demonstrating a lack of trust. If so, subordinates 
may respond with destructive behaviors, such as an increase in dishonest activities or lack of 
effort (Christ 2013). One purpose of implementing controls is to reduce the monetary costs of 
subordinates’ potential unethical behavior. Reciprocity considers the social costs arising from 
creating an environment where perception may create a caustic relationship between 
subordinates and organizations (Von Siemens 2013; Falk and Kossel 2006).  
This paper examines different dimensions that create an individual’s sensitivity to 
reciprocity, by categorizing subjects into specific types. In this study, sensitivity to reciprocity is 
defined as the magnitude of response to either positive or negative interactions between two 
parties. Previous literature suggests that three primary dimensions comprise an individual’s 
reciprocal reactions: preferences for distributional fairness, perceptions of trust between parties, 
and perceptions of the intention underlying another’s actions.6 I use the three dimensions to 
develop a measurement scale for individuals’ trait sensitivity to interactions that cause states of 
                                                          
5 Budgetary slack occurs within principle agent scenarios when the agent has access to private information which 
they can utilize to increase their retained wealth through the process of reporting budgets to allocate more assets to 
themselves at the detriment of the principle. 
6 Initially there were four dimensions identified, distributional fairness, trust, intention, and attribution. However, 
tests indicated that individuals have difficulty disentangling attribution from intention, therefore the final three 
dimensions of distributional fairness, trust, and intention were kept. 
A VIEW INTO RECIPROCITY – Green 2019 
 
34 
 
heightened reciprocity. The development of this scale begins by identifying manipulations used 
in previous studies that have effectively utilized the three key dimensions of reciprocity. 
Manipulations used in previous studies are then adapted to develop survey questions. Items from 
two previously developed personality trait surveys relating to distributional fairness, trust, and 
intention are also used. These two sources lead to an initial list of 126 potential survey items. 
I used a series of steps to reduce the initial set of 126 items into a more parsimonious 
scale by first engaging in a literature search, generating a sample of items, then purifying the 
measure (Churchill 1979; Watson and Clark 1995; Hurtt 2010; Ashton and Lee 2014; Watson 
and Clark 1999). Subsets of trait dimensions were developed using the three identified 
dimensions. The subsets allow the creation of a more manageable list of items to implement for 
initial testing. For example, within the dimension “intention,” four subsets come to focus, 
including anger, impulsiveness, reaction to control, and reaction to feedback. The items were 
checked to make certain that approximately an equal number of items represented each of 
subsets of the four original dimensions.  
The process resulted in a reduced scale of 45 items. A doctoral-level group trained in 
behavioral studies pre-tested the refined list of 45 items. These individuals participated in a Q-
sort survey through Qualtrics. The objective of the Q-sort exercise was to identify whether the 
participants perceived each item to be representative of the intended dimension and create a 
survey to deploy via MTurk for three subsequent factor analyses.  
This study gathered data from a total of 4787 participants, using Amazon Mechanical 
                                                          
7 This number excludes participants who were removed from the study due to not being within the U.S. or who 
attempted to participate twice. The information for exclusion was based on a review of IP addresses provided by 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
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Turk8 (MTurk) in conjunction with Qualtrics. Exploratory factor analysis was conducted within 
two survey groups to bring an initial item list of 41 items, down to a reduced scale of 19 based 
factor loadings of items on each underlying dimension to confirm the validity of the reciprocity 
scale created. Finally, confirmatory factor analyses were conducted from a third MTurk 
recruitment to reduce the scale further to a final 14-item measure of sensitivity to reciprocity. 
However, the fit indices for this scale did not meet desired levels of goodness of fit. Further, this 
model did not exhibit predictive ability in an economic setting. 
The measure of reciprocity developed in this study provides an initial step into 
developing a tool that allows one to measure individual differences of sensitivity to reciprocity. 
However, the results indicate that further work is needed to refine this measure. An increased 
understanding of reciprocity will also lead to practical implications, for example, organizations’ 
ability to design effective controls that reduce subordinates’ destructive reciprocal behaviors, 
such as budgetary slack or reduced levels of effort within the context of participative budgeting. 
Further, businesses may be able to take effective actions if they are able to take inventory of an 
individual’s trait reciprocity. The values of an individual’s inventory items and a subordinates’ 
perception would allow companies to predict how controls affect an individual’s reciprocity. For 
example, an organization may be able to examine individual traits and design a more effective 
incentive system. Prior literature indicates that individuals’ response to a bonus offer may 
                                                          
8 While Amazon Mechanical Turk does have difficulties, crowdsourcing information has shown to be an effective 
method in lieu of traditional methods. Hunt (2015) has compiled a comprehensive roadmap to effectively deploy 
surveys that can be applicable for behavioral studies. Much of which garnered from studies assessing demographics 
and applicableness (Ipeirotis 2010; Ross, Zaldivar, Irani, and Tomlinson 2009; Paolacci et al. 2010; Berinsky, 
Huber, Lenz, 2012; Brandon, Long, Loras, Mueller-Phillips, Vansant 2013; Peer, Vosgerau, and Acquisti 2014; Peer 
et al. 2015; Horton, Rand, Zeckhauser 2011; Mason and Suri 2012; Winter and Suri 2012). 
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depend on their perception of the reason for the bonus. An organization may offer a bonus to be 
competitive, or with the company’s intent to show goodwill toward employees (Choi 2014).  
Further, additional research on  the constructs underlying reciprocity will facilitate our 
ability to empirically tease apart varying explanations for observed behaviors. For example, if a 
superior’s review is implemented in which the subordinate is under periodic scrutiny for their 
behavior, subordinates could perceive it differently based on their perceptions of the superior’s 
intention. A subordinate who is not particularly sensitive to reciprocity may perceive the control 
as being implemented for the well-being of the organization, and its implementation is a 
necessary action the superior must undertake. Conversely, a subordinate who is highly sensitive 
to reciprocity, especially within the dimension of intention and trust, could perceive that control 
implementation indicates a lack of trust from the superior. In turn, the subordinate is likely to 
respond with destructive and or dishonest behavior. If both types of subordinates are present, the 
overall effectiveness of the control may be unclear without the ability to measure and control for 
individual differences in sensitivity to reciprocity.  
DIMENSIONS OF RECIPROCITY 
To design a scale to measure reciprocity, we must first identify dimensions on which 
reciprocity is based (Churchill 1979; Clark and Watson 1998). While many behavioral 
accounting studies draw upon reciprocity to predict or explain observed behaviors, they often use 
other dimensions to explain or manipulate reciprocal effects. The key recurring dimensions that 
underline reciprocity are those of preferences for distributional fairness, trust between parties, 
and perceptions of the intention underlying the other party’s actions (hereafter distributional 
fairness, trust, and intention). Reciprocity is not, however, singularly interchangeable with any of 
these three dimensions. Reciprocity is a response to these dimensions in various combinations, 
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rather than a purely altruistic or punitive behavior. Sensitivity to reciprocity is the magnitude of 
reciprocal response to an interaction between two parties. Given the intertwined nature of the 
dimensions of reciprocity, all three dimensions are utilized in this study to create a 
comprehensive measure. For example, subordinates may perceive that a superior’s actions are an 
indication of negative intent and result in a lack of distributional fairness. They may reciprocate 
with negative behaviors. Reciprocity can also incorporate strategic adjustment of one’s behavior 
due to others’ anticipated response. For example, a superior may offer certain incentives 
strategically to encourage a positive reciprocal reaction from subordinates. 
To develop this measure, I focus on the specific weights an individual places on the 
importance of distributional fairness, trust, and intention. Because of the Q-sort results outlined 
in a subsequent section of the measurement design, the fourth dimension, attribution, was 
removed for this study due to the inability to effectively parse out these items. The importance 
placed on each dimension allows for ex-ante predictions of differences in individual reactions to 
state-inducing interactions. Responses in the form of actions to these combined dimensions are 
key to reciprocity. Previous literature defines reciprocity as the expectation that individuals will 
reward kind behaviors and punish unkind behavior. In the following section, I summarize key 
examples of observed reciprocal interactions within each dimension. For each dimension, the 
expected responses of individuals with varying levels of sensitivity to that dimension are 
explained.  
Distributional Fairness 
 One dimension that underlies observed reciprocal actions is distributional fairness, which 
refers to an individual’s propensity to feel discomfort due to a perceived lack of fairness between 
parties interacting with one another (Douthit and Stevens 2014; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton 
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and Ockenfels 2000). For contextualization in behavioral research, we can define distributional 
fairness more specifically as perceptions of distributed wealth among individuals within a 
community. When wealth is unevenly distributed, there is an increased likelihood that 
individuals reciprocate by acting in a manner that attempts to restore a sense of equilibrium 
(Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004). When individuals are in a position in which they have a 
great deal more wealth than another party, they may act to distribute a portion of their own 
wealth to the other party to restore a sense of balance (Ben-Ner 2004; Kagel and Roth 1995; 
Hoffman et al. 1994; Eckel and Grossman 1996; Bolton et al. 1998). Individuals typically do not 
take full advantage of self-interested opportunities arising from competitive markets, because 
maintaining equilibrium in markets benefits the overall wealth all parties (Fehr et al. 1998; Fehr 
et al.1993). However, when individuals within an exchange are perceived to act overly 
opportunistically, other players tend to respond negatively. For example, individuals perceived to 
be acting opportunistically may receive punishment from those with whom they are interacting 
(Fehr and Gächter 2002; Fehr et al. 1997; Fehr, Ernst and Riedl 1993). Similarly, within the 
scope of market interactions, if a seller in a market acts in a monopolistic fashion, consumers 
will likely reciprocate by engaging in trade with players not acting in such an individual manner 
(Rabin 1993; Kahneman et al. 1986; Carnegie 1889), thus reducing the opportunistic seller’s 
wealth, even to the detriment of the purchasers (usually in the form of higher costs).  
 Distributional fairness concerns also lead to a strategic adjustment of individuals’ 
behavior due to the response they anticipate they will receive. Individuals tend to make decisions 
that do not distribute available excess wealth to themselves in participative budgeting settings 
(Evans et al. 2001; Brown et al. 2009; Young 1985; Waller 1988; Chow et al.). This behavior 
may occur when an individual engages in trade decisions as purchasers. In a brainstorming 
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bargaining strategy study, purchasers who are primed to consider the vendor’s position adjust 
their behavior to favor distributional fairness. They act more cooperatively with vendors due to 
the increased saliency of both participants’ outcomes (Maxwell et al. 1999). Additionally, when 
a vendor acts unfairly, purchasers respond with negative reciprocity in the form of uncooperative 
interactions (Maxwell et al. 2003).  
 The most profound effects from individuals reacting to deeds that promote distributional 
fairness, or lack thereof, is the relationship between superiors and subordinates. A key concept in 
this area is fairness of pay to subordinates. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) demonstrate distributional 
fairness in their fair wage-effort theory, which states that subordinates who are paid under a level 
they perceive to be a fair wage will respond negatively in the form of exerting lower levels of 
effort. This response can be interpreted as subordinates behaving in a manner they perceive as 
equalizing the wealth they provide to the organization in response to the wealth they receive.  
Predicted Responses to Distributional Fairness 
Distributional fairness concerns indicate an individual’s desire to act in a way that 
restores balance, or parity, between parties exchanging wealth (Akerlof 1982; Akerlof and 
Yellen 1988, 1990). High sensitivity to distributional fairness would be predictive of various 
types of behavior primarily dependent on the initially established equilibrium between the 
parties. First, individuals who possess high sensitivity to distributional fairness would be more 
willing to give up their own wealth if they believe others within an exchange are being given a 
lesser share. Conversely, the same individuals would be more likely to act in a way that punishes 
those within an exchange who are not behaving fairly, even if they sacrifice their own wealth 
(Fehr et al. 1998; Rabin 1993). If individuals possess a low sensitivity toward distributional 
fairness, we would expect behavior similar to that predicted under economic agency theory. 
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Specifically, individuals will put little consideration into what is fair when making decisions and 
will behave in a way that maximizes their own wealth. Figure 2 illustrates how individuals with 
varying levels of sensitivity to distributional fairness are expected to reciprocate to high and low 
levels of distributional fairness.  
[Insert Figure 2  Here] 
Trust 
Trust between parties is a second dimension underlying observed reciprocal actions. 
Bradach and Eccles (1989, 104) define trust as “a type of expectation that alleviates the fear that 
one's exchange partner will act opportunistically.” To illustrate how trust relates to reciprocity, 
we can examine an interaction between a superior and subordinate in a participative budgeting 
scenario. In this example, a superior may or may not demonstrate that he or she trusts a 
subordinate, and the subordinate reciprocates9. If a superior’s actions indicate that he or she 
trusts the subordinate, a subordinate may respond in a reciprocal manner by acting with 
increased levels of honesty. This honesty benefits the superior. However, if the superior shows 
signs of distrust, many times in the form of implementing additional controls such as a hurdle 
contract, the subordinate may no longer view the decision as one of an ethical dilemma. This 
removes from the subordinate any inherent disutility felt by acting dishonestly (Evans 2001 et 
al.; Rankin et al. 2008)10.  
In contrast, superiors may reciprocate with actions that demonstrate lower levels of trust 
when they perceive subordinates acting in a dishonest manner. Superiors may be willing to go so 
                                                          
9 Because honesty is generally utilized in accounting experiments as a dependent variable based on a trust 
manipulation, the focus of this dimension is trust. 
10 A hurdle contract is one utilized in participative budgeting that introduces a fixed limit on what a subordinate is 
able to submit project budgets for. 
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far as to forego their own wealth creation by rejecting a dishonest budget (Schatzberg and 
Stevens 2008). Superior and subordinate wealth generation is typically zero for both parties in 
the case of a rejected budget. Here, traditional economic theory would predict that the superior 
should accept all projects. Budget rejection, however, may be justified to punish dishonest 
behavior and prevent future acts of dishonesty (Rankin et al. 2008, Falk and Kosfeld 2006).  
The misuse of private information occurs within participative budgeting scenarios where 
the subordinate has incentives to create budgetary slack. Budgetary slack occurs when a budget 
requests amounts greater than needed to attain an organization’s goals. Budgetary slack increases 
subordinates’ wealth while simultaneously reducing the wealth of the superior. Traditional 
economic theory predicts that a subordinate will create as much slack as they can to maximize 
their own wealth. An individual’s actions are often consistent with preferences that include a 
utility for honesty (Brown et al. 2009). Evans et al. (2001), a seminal study, experimentally 
examined subordinates engaged within a trust contract where the organization gave full decision 
power to subordinates, while submitting budget reports based on private information. Under 
these conditions, negative repercussions are limited, even if subordinates acted in a self-
interested manner, taking full advantage of the inherent information asymmetry to increase their 
wealth. Evans’ (2001) results indicated that subordinates still acted in a partially honest fashion 
when trusted by the principal, despite the limited economic downside of acting dishonestly. One 
interpretation of these results is that the agents’ actions were consistent with a demonstration of 
positive reciprocity in response to trust exhibited by the organization. Christ (2013) also 
documented that subordinates reciprocate with destructive behaviors to controls they perceive 
superiors implemented due to lack of trust. This behavior would occur even if the purpose of the 
controls was to improve reporting accuracy.  
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Predicted Responses to Trust  
If individuals in a position of trust by a superior have a positive predisposition toward 
trust, we would expect that, regardless of their ability to do so, they would not take advantage of 
a situation to increase their own wealth. This behavior contrasts with predictions made under 
traditional economic agency theory (Evans et al. 2001). If individuals are not trust-sensitive, we 
would expect that they would take actions to increase their own wealth, with little regard for the 
act of the principle fully entrusting them. Figure 3 illustrates how individuals reciprocate 
behavior with low to high levels of sensitivity to trust.  
Choi (2014) additionally explores bonus offers within the dimension of trust in 
accounting literature. Choi examines whether a sign of goodwill is positively reciprocated, using 
context as a major prediction factor. Specifically, an employer offers a signing bonus to 
demonstrate its increased belief in trusting the employee. Choi finds the act of the employer 
conveying to the employee that there is an excess of available workers compounds the goodwill 
context. Choi demonstrates that the employer does not necessarily need to offer a bonus to entice 
a new hire to accept its offer.  
[Insert Figure 3 Here] 
Intention 
A third dimension underlying observed reciprocal actions is the perceived intention 
underlying the other party’s actions. Intention is an individual’s perception of the reason for 
another party’s actions (Falk and Kosfield 2006; Falk and Fischbacher 2006; Rabin 1993; 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004, Blout 1995; Falk et al. 2000, 2003; Charness 2004; Charness 
and Rabin 2002). Without an individual’s perception of a second party’s intention, there would 
be little basis for a reciprocal action to take place. Simply put, if an individual believes that a 
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person acts toward them with neither positive nor ill intention, the individual would perceive the 
act as innocuous. Reciprocation would neither be positive nor negative behavior without context 
altering the perceived act. Intention may overlap with the other dimensions discussed in prior 
sections, as the perception may be that the underlying intention was to indicate trust or distrust 
(Falk and Kosfield 2006; Falk and Fischbacher 2006), or it may be that the perceived intent is to 
create distributional fairness.  
The relation between intention and reciprocal actions is demonstrated in the behavioral 
accounting literature primarily in cases of participative budgeting where a superior is able to 
impose control over a subordinate. Christ (2013), discussed briefly in the prior section, observed 
that subordinate reactions to a control implementation are contingent on the perceived intentions 
underlying that implementation. She examined whether subordinates perceive the control as 
intentionally implemented due to a superior’s lack of trust. Christ reports negative reciprocity is 
more likely to occur than if such perceived intention is absent. Economic studies also examine 
individuals’ ability to manipulate perceived intention to increase their wealth. For example, 
Rabin (1993) finds that suppliers can act in a non-self-serving manner to induce positive 
reciprocal behavior from purchasers, thereby increasing their return of wealth. This study 
indicates that anticipation of potential negative reciprocity has the ability to direct individuals’ 
decisions.  
Intentionality also influences reciprocal actions in response to employment contracts. A 
new hire’s subsequent effort and likelihood to accept a job offer may be a reciprocal response to 
the perceived intention of the employer in creating certain aspects of the employment contract. 
Choi (2014) examines whether the perception of a bonus was an intentional signal of trust or 
merely a tactic to entice potential new hires to accept a job offer. In the scenario introduced by 
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Choi, both the perception of another’s motives (i.e., intention) and an individual’s perception of 
self-worth and deservedness of a bonus contract (i.e., attribution) are involved in determining the 
reciprocal action11. Individuals who perceived a potential bonus offer as an intentional signal of 
trust were more likely to exhibit higher levels of effort once the position was accepted than those 
who believed it was a necessity for the employer to obtain a new hire. 
Predicted Responses for to Intention 
Christ (2013) examined individuals’ increased sensitivity to intention (i.e., a 
predisposition that intensifies reactions dependent on a perceived intention from another), where 
activities could be perceived to contain negative connotations. In the presence of negative 
connotations (i.e., a direct control put in place by a superior acting in a self-serving manner), 
individuals should act in a far more destructive manner than with activities that are ambiguous or 
indirect (Christ 2013). Conversely, if  individuals have lower sensitivity to intention (i.e., a 
predisposition that lessens reactions dependent on a perceived intention from another), they 
should be less likely to exhibit reciprocal behavior. Figure 4 illustrates how individuals with 
varying levels of sensitivity to intention are expected to respond to acts perceived to be positive 
or negative12.  
[Insert Figure 4 Here] 
                                                          
11 Intention and attribution (see figure 5) are often closely related in this research. As such, attribution theory had 
been explored as a possible fourth dimension for the reciprocity measure developed in this study. However, pilot 
study results indicated that individuals found it hard to distinguish between intention and attribution items. 
Therefore, I focus on intention in this study and discuss potential follow up investigations to examine whether or not 
these two dimensions are able to be fully disentangled within the context of reciprocity. 
12 This perception is manipulated by adjusting the new hire market as being either scarce or inflated. 
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SCALE DEVELOPMENT 
Developing an Initial Item Pool 
Once the dimensions underlying reciprocity have been defined, Churchill (1979) and 
Clark and Watson (1995) suggest collecting an initial pool of items to measure the dimensions 
by utilizing previous measures of similar or identical dimension traits. Building upon procedures 
described by Churchill (see Figure 6), I compiled an initial collection of 126 items (see Table 3). 
Each was formatted into a five-point Likert scale, ranging from one, “strongly disagree,” to five, 
“strongly agree.” The compiled items indicate either an increase or decrease in sensitivity to one 
of the three previously outlined dimensions: distributional fairness, trust, or intention. Of these 
126 items, 48 were adapted from the HEXACO-PI-R scale, (Ashton and De Vries 2014). This 
scale measures various personality traits, many of which parallel the three dimensions chosen for 
this measurement development.13 An examination of previously validated definitions, 
manipulations, and measures from prior accounting studies identified 78 additional items. 
Reciprocal behaviors such as control implementation, participative budgeting, and contract 
negotiation are directly related to these items.14 Specifically, the following studies were 
identified and used to create items for this scale: Christ (2013), Choi (2014), Douthit and Stevens 
(2015), Schatzberg and Stevens (2008), Fisher et al. (2015), Linderbaum and Levey (2010), Ke 
and Yu (2006), Ho et. al. (2018), Evans et al. (2001), Douthit (2017), Lowe and Recker (1994), 
                                                          
13 This design is similar to the design in Peer et. al 2014, which tests multiple measures on Amazon Mechanical 
Turk including the “Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003), Rosenberg’s 10-
item Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1979), the short, 18-item form of the Need for Cognition scale (NFC; 
Cacioppo, Petty, & Feng Kao, 1984), and the short, 10-item form of the Social Desirability Scale (SDS; Fischer 
& Fick, 1993).”  The goal of which was to confirm data sufficiency from participant reputations. 
14 These are amongst those that are most affected by reciprocal actions (see the literature review portion of this 
dissertation for more discussion on this issue). 
 
A VIEW INTO RECIPROCITY – Green 2019 
 
46 
 
Fehr and Hatcher (1993).15 Table 2 identifies definitions provided by these studies for the three 
primary dimensions and indicates the studies used to develop items for each dimension.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
[Insert Figure 6 Here] 
I first identified relevant items and key measures used in prior studies. Next, I converted 
the identified items into the format necessary to develop this study’s reciprocity scale. For 
example, Christ (2013) manipulated the saliency of a control to direct the subordinate’s attention 
to the source of the control, and implemented at three levels, endogenous (direct), exogenous 
(indirect), and uncertain. The study found that participants who were able to directly link the 
control to their superior felt the control to be a signal of distrust and reciprocated with lower 
levels of effort. To convert this manipulation to a scale item, I have operationalized it with a 
question, such as “I am likely to exert less’ (more) effort under circumstances in which process 
controls are (are not) explicitly outlined by my direct superior.” Each item is coded according to 
the underlying dimension being manipulated by the study (e.g., intention) and the relevant 
dependent variables expected to be affected in the study (e.g., effort and trust). Further, where 
possible, I have noted possible language variations such as “less/more” and “are/are not” (as in 
the above example). This results in two separate potential questions, one stated positively, and 
one stated negatively, enabling the use of reverse scoring to both increase the pool of available 
                                                          
15 To determine whether each study was appropriate for inclusion, journal rankings are considered based on Brigham 
Young University (BYU) and Scimago Journal & Country Rank. These rankings examine where the specific 
experiment was published, or if one of the contributing authors has previously published in a higher tier journal 
(http://www.scimagojr.com). 
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questions and protect from the possibility of dimension under-representation, a key threat to 
validity (Hurtt 2010; Messick 1995)16.  
Several questions were developed to ensure items were not directionally ambiguous. 
These questions addressed the same underlying research question in more direct terms. For 
example, some items were adapted from Linderbaum and Levey (2010). One of the original 
items was “I feel self-assured when dealing with feedback.” This item measures intention 
regarding how one assesses feedback for their efforts but lacks directional clarity for measuring 
positive or negative reciprocity. Therefore, this item was adjusted as follows: “I feel self-assured 
when dealing with negative feedback.” The modified item allows for a better assessment of a 
dimension of intention (Sicoly and Ross 1977; Ross and Sicoly 1979). Those who are sensitive 
to such a measure are more likely to disavow negative feedback as it conflicts with their 
perception of self-assurance.  
Refining the Pool of Potential Items 
 To test my initial pool of questions for content validity, I reviewed my initial scale with 
an expert well established in participative budgeting from Virginia Commonwealth University, 
similar to DeVellis (2016). The reviewed examined clarity and redundancy between the items 
and assessed their efficiency. The goal was to reduce the initial pool of 126 questions to a more 
manageable size for future experimental study (Hurtt 2010). To do so, the questions were 
separated into four groups based on their underlying dimensions: distributional fairness, trust, 
intention, and attribution. Items were first paired down by removing questions that showed 
redundancies to a shorter list of 80 (20 items per dimension). I then analyzed the text of items 
                                                          
16 Whether the items are positive or negative, stronger responses still indicate an increased sensitivity to reciprocity 
because reciprocity acts as a duality in regards to the behavior it can incite refining 
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within these dimensions for recurring themes within each dimension group, this provided two to 
five unique underlying themes within each dimension which further removed redundancies. For 
example, within the dimension of intention, the common underlying themes in the items were 
found to be four, including anger, impulsiveness, controls, and feedback. To make certain that 
each of these underlying themes were properly represented, two to three questions from each 
theme was chosen. This process resulted in a reduced pool of 45 items (14 for ‘trust’, 10 for 
‘distributional fairness’, 10 for ‘intention’, and 11 for ‘attribution’).17 The writing for most of the 
items was at a 7th-9th grade level per the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s 
specifications (ahrq.gov). The items average nine words each, and approximately half of these 
items will be reverse-coded. Table 4 lists these items along with their intended primary 
dimension.  
The relation between the pool of 45 items and the underlying dimensions was then 
assessed using a Q-sort function deployed through Qualtrics. This initial examination uses Q-sort 
as it provides “the extent of agreement among people in the way in which concepts are employed 
can be assessed” (Block 1961). I asked a panel of individuals consisting of professors, graduate 
students, and undergraduate students from various universities to complete the Q-sort task. 
Participants were given brief definitions of the four dimensions included in Q-sort to ensure that 
they used the same base definitions. 
 [Insert Table 4 Here] 
To confirm that these definitions were clear, words potentially above an elementary level 
were hyperlinked to a Merriam-Webster Dictionary that provides either a direct definition or a 
                                                          
17 Up to this point the study still utilized four dimensions: distributional fairness, trust, intention, and attribution. 
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synonym. The panel was tasked with sorting the 45 items (appearing in random order for each 
participant) into each of the four dimensions. I assessed the clarity of the match between the 
individual items and the intended underlying dimensions after the exercise was completed by the 
participants whom were recruited for the task. The number of clicks each individual made was 
tracked by coding the Qualtrics instrument. Analyzing the number of clicks provides information 
about any terms that are potentially confusing to participants. Once complete, Q-sort statistics 
indicated items for which there was most consensus from participants in identifying the 
underlying dimension.  
Using Q-sort data, I analyzed the 45 items to identifying which items best represent each 
of the underlying dimensions.18 All items were examined to determine if they had high levels of 
participants’ agreement, indicating that the item captured the intended dimension. The results 
indicated cross overs between multiple items that were intended to represent attribution and the 
dimensions of intention and distributional fairness. After reviewing these items, it was 
determined that questions created with the intent to capture attribution either had insufficient 
agreement between participants or loaded more heavily on other dimensions. Therefore, 
attribution was removed entirely. The initial pool of 126 items was revisited, and an additional 5 
items that were both clear and closely followed the themes found within the remaining three 
dimensions were added. Specifically, two items were added to capture the dimension of trust, 
and two items were added for the dimension of distributional fairness. This adjustment to the 
scale resulted in a scale of 41 items19.  
                                                          
18 For comparison, the professional skepticism scale developed by Hurtt (2010) consists of 32 items. 
19 45-11 items removed for attribution, and 5 additional chosen from the previous pool of 126. 
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Testing the Reduced Scale  
The development of the scale using MTurk was conducted in three phases. Each phase is 
described in detail in the following sections. 
First Phase of Scale Development 
I administered the reduced 41 item scale using Qualtrics deployed through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The increasing use of MTurk has provided a rich source of survey 
data from experimental participants for studies in the accounting literature (Farrell et al. 2016; 
Koonce et al. 2015; Rennekamp 2012). Additionally, MTurk is an efficient method to obtain 
sufficient responses when using various factor analysis methods. This is true when using a 
specific population such as accounting professionals or non-specialized populations that may be 
required when developing general trait measures.  
Prior literature indicates that four observations are required per item to obtain a sample 
sufficient to have adequate power for factor analysis (Fabrigar et al. 1999). Thus, 41 items x 4 
observations result in a minimum participant pool of 164 individuals. Survey items were 
presented with five-point Likert-type response, ranging from one indicating “strongly disagree,” 
to five indicating “strongly agree.” As some observations were found to be of poor quality, 180 
individuals were recruited from MTurk (Hunt 2015).20 Participants were offered $1.00 to 
complete the 41-item scale. This payment ensured that I attracted a proper amount of “engaged” 
individuals. As the scale should take less than five minutes to complete, this pay rate exceeds 
Amazon’s suggested rate of $6/hour ($1 for 10 minutes) for US workers (Amazon 2011; Hunt 
2015).  
                                                          
20 Approval for recruiting participants through MTurk for all three factor analyses and student experiments were 
approved through VCU’s Office of Research and Innovation IRB review panel (see Appendix 2 and 3). 
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Within the MTurk task, no personal data was collected.21 I requested that participants 
only consist of individuals within the U.S. to ensure that there weren’t major cultural differences 
among participants which could skew responses further than intended.22 Within the survey two  
questions were inserted at random points to confirm that participants were fluent in English. 
These questions were posed as follows:   
"Please complete this sentence  
"I haven't got…"     
○ no brothers or sisters.     
○ brothers or sisters.     
○ any brothers or sisters.     
○ some brothers and sisters.     
Please select the correct phrase 
○ Always he arrives at 2:30     
○ He arrives at always 2:30     
○ He always arrives at 2:30     
○ He always at 2:30 arrives    
To ensure that the participants were engaged, two screening questions were embedded 
within the survey to test whether individuals are mindful of their responses. These questions 
instructed participants to  “Please select ‘Neither agree nor disagree’” and “Please select the 
answer ‘Green’”. The inclusion of these questions  brought  the total number of questions for the 
survey to 45. Qualtrics was programmed to randomize the order of the individual items for 
participants to avoid the potential for the data being skewed by order effects that might occur if 
all participants saw the items in the same order. Basic demographic questions were asked at the 
end of the instrument (i.e., gender, age, and education).  
                                                          
21 Unless specifically requested, participants’ personal information is not provided to individuals collecting data via 
MTurk. Additional information on MTurk workers’ information security can be found at 
https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=footer_privacy?ie=UTF8&nodeId=468496. 
22 A number of participants outside of the U.S. were able to participate despite the requirement that participants be a 
native to the U.S.. All non-U.S. respondents were removed by locating each responder’s IP address to confirm their 
location. Additionally, because each request for recruits were issued in batches of nine (additional fees are charged 
by MTurk for requests over nine participants) there was a potential for participants to participant in multiple batches, 
therefore any individuals who did so were also removed from the pool.  
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After the survey data was collected, I examined responses using an exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) utilizing maximum likelihood factor extraction including oblique rotation 
(Fabrigar et al. 1999; Linderbaum and Levey 2010). EFA is used primarily as it allows items to 
load on multiple factors. The three dimensions underlying the items are expected to build 
towards an overarching theory of reciprocity. Therefore, I expected the factors to be related, but 
it was necessary to examine whether items cross-loaded too heavily. The analysis was performed 
in RStudio.23  Because this study is intended to examine potential differences in individual 
sensitivities to reciprocity, this initial EFA extracted three factors. Also, EFA results indicated 
whether any individual items appeared to have secondary loadings (Linderbaum and Levey 
2010). It is anticipated that the primary item loadings within the three individual dimensions will 
likely overlap, as they share some similarities. Table 5 shows factor loading results. This first 
EFA was examined to identify items that loaded well on a primary dimension (> 0.5 factor 
loading) with no secondary loadings > 0.3 on any secondary dimensions (Riggio et al. 2010; 
Brown 2005).24  
From this analysis, a fourth dimension appeared.25 Upon review of the five items that 
loaded on this fourth dimension, the of length of a relationship between individuals was a 
common theme. As this construct was not part of the initial design, these five items were 
removed and a second EFA was conducted with the remaining 36 items (Osborne and Fitzpatrick 
2012). Osborne and Fitzpatrick (2012) also suggests examining exploratory factor analyses in 
                                                          
23 R was utilized initially due to its ability to run both Exploratory Factor Analysis and Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis. All subsequent data analysis was developed via IBM SPSS. 
24 For this initial analysis all items that loaded well on the original 3 factors were kept, leaving 36 items for the 
secondary EFA to be conducted.  
25 Analysis was done with RStudio to test for fit of a 4 factor, 3 factor, 2 factor and 1 factor model. Through this a 
fourth dimension emerged. 
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multiple forms, specifically allowing the EFA to take on varying numbers of factor loadings. 
Appendix 1 presents the initial instrument used in MTurk.26 
 [Insert Table 5 Here] 
Second Phase of Scale Development 
A second data collection using Qualtrics deployed through MTurk was conducted with 
the reduced scale of 36 items reduced scale. After removing any responses outside the U.S. and 
potential duplicate entries, the final respondents totaled 144.  This number of participants 
fulfilled the previously stated requirement of four observations per item (4 x 36 = 144). I again 
examined the results using an EFA utilizing an oblique rotation. I selected all items that loaded 
well on a primary dimension ( > 0.5 factor loading) with no secondary loadings > 0.3 on any 
secondary dimensions, and all other items were removed. This resulted in a further reduced scale 
of 19 items.  
Third Phase of Scale Development 
Finally, I collected data a third time deploying a Qualtrics survey through MTurk, using 
the new reduced 19 item scale. Marsh, Hau, Balla, and Grayson (1998) state that for a three-
dimension measure an estimated pool of 100 to 125 participants is sufficient. Consistent with this 
guidance, I was left with a pool of 168 participants after removing any data that was unusable. I 
conducted a confirmatory factor analysis on the resulting data. Initially, a three-factor model was 
estimated to reflect the dimensions of “Trust” “Distributional Fairness” and “Intention”. This 
analysis produced alpha values of 0.909, 0.582, and 0.587, respectively, as shown in Table 6.  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
                                                          
26 All iterations of the MTurk surveys were identical in form, but the second and third surveys contained fewer items 
due it item removal based on the exploratory factor analyses. 
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Given the poor fit statistics for the three-factor model X² = 413.886, p < 0.001, CFI = 
0.757, TLI = 0.719, RMSEA = 0.113 SRMR = 0.095) (see Table 6), a secondary confirmatory 
factor analysis was conducted with a two-factor model. This model returned two factors 
consisting of 14 items that aligned closely to the dimensions of “Trust” and “Distributional 
Fairness” constructs, with alphas of 0.923 and 0.652, respectively (see Table 7) . Further, 
estimation for the two-factor analysis resulted in the following values:  X² = 305.528, p < 0.001, 
CFI = 0.807, TLI = 0.768, RMSEA = 0.134 SRMR = 0.087. These indices are below the 
recommended level for a sufficient fit (e.g., Bagozzi and Yi 1988; Browne and Cudeck, 1992; 
Riggio, et al. 2010). Thus, these results suggest that these items did not result in a multi-factor 
model with adequate fit to represent sensitivity to reciprocity. However, the 14-item two-factor 
model is slightly better than the anticipated three-factor model in terms of alphas and fit. 
Analyses with the two-factor model and with each dimension individually are examined in 
conjunction with a laboratory experiment, as described in the next section. A single dimension 
model was analyzed using both “Trust” and “Distributional Fairness” independently and neither 
of which showed strong results, returning values of : X² =151.37, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.863, TLI = 
0.808, RMSEA = 0.198 SRMR = 0.060 and X² = 149.11, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.975, TLI = 0.959, 
RMSEA = 0.047 SRMR = 0.044 respectively.   
 [Insert Table 7 Here] 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
EXPERIMENT UTILIZING SENSITIVITY TO RECIPROCITY SCALE 
I conducted further analyses in tandem with a previously validated experimental setting 
designed to elicit reciprocal behaviors. Participants were students recruited from the 
Experimental Laboratory for Economics and Business Research (ELEBR) volunteer database at 
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Virginia Commonwealth University. Invitations to participate in the experiment were sent 
through the ELEBR participant database. Volunteers signed up to complete an online survey, 
followed by an experimental session at the ELEBR computer lab. Prior to participating in the 
laboratory experiment, each participant was sent a link to complete the reciprocity measure via 
Qualtrics. Once they completed the reciprocity measure, they were provided a randomly 
generated participant ID number. This ID was required for participation in the following lab 
experiment. 
Lab Experiment 
Z-Tree software was used to conduct the laboratory experiment based on the economic 
trust game designed by Berg et al. (1995). In this game, individuals rarely act entirely selfishly 
and often act in a reciprocal manner. The game examines two aspects of reciprocity, the 
anticipation of a first mover’s expectations of potential reciprocal behavior and the subsequent 
action taken by a second mover. This design, therefore, facilitates a test of the reciprocity scale’s 
ability to predict and explain individual differences in reciprocal behaviors.  
 Participants responded to understanding checks to ensure they are aware of rules guiding 
the experiment throughout the instructions. Participants were instructed that the game was a one-
round economic exchange and their decisions directly affected another’s earnings within the 
room to emphasize the impact of their decision. At the beginning of the experiment, participants 
were assigned one of two roles: Employee or manager,27 participants in each role are paired 
randomly and anonymously with a participant in the other role. The Berg et al. (1995) economic 
                                                          
27 Originally in this experimental design by Berg et al. (1995), individuals were denoted simply by whether they 
were in room A (first decision maker) or room B (second decision maker), other previous research has referred to 
participants as either player 1 and player 2. For the purpose of this study we contextualize the participants as either 
employee or manager respectively.  
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trust game employs two stages. First, the manager receives an initial endowment of $10 and 
decides whether to transfer an amount (X1) to their manager. The amount transferred from the 
employee to the manager is tripled (3X1). Therefore, if the employee transfers $3 of their 
endowment, the manager will receive 3 x $3 = $9. In stage two, the manager receives 
information about how much of the initial endowment from their employee transferred and the 
tripled amount based on this transfer. The manager then decides whether to send an amount back 
to their employee (X2). Once the manager makes their decision, both participants receive 
information about all decisions and their earnings from their decisions. In addition to their 
earnings, all participants receive a $5 show-up fee.  
 Payment calculations:  
Employee payout = $5–X1 + X2  
Manager payout = $5 + 3X1 - X2 
The experiment was as a one-shot interaction. After answering post-experimental questions, each 
participant was paid in cash. Appendix 4 presents screenshots of the experiment implemented in 
the lab setting. 
Tests of the Reciprocity Measure 
I examined 14-item, two-factor sensitivity to reciprocity model to see if it was useful in 
predicting and explaining decisions made by the laboratory experiment participants. Participants 
completed this 14-item measure remotely via Qualtrics before the laboratory session and as part 
of the exit questionnaire at the conclusion of the laboratory session. After aggregating scores 
from both the pre-experiment survey, and post-experiment survey, I calculated a scaled score for 
all participants measuring from 1 representing low sensitivity to reciprocity, to 5 representing 
high sensitivity to reciprocity. Both a continuous measure and a 50/50 median split were used in 
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subsequent analyses to designate participants as either having high or low sensitivities to 
reciprocity.  
Those in the employee role with high sensitivities to reciprocity are expected to anticipate 
the reciprocal response of their manager. In turn, employees who anticipate reciprocal actions are 
likely to transfer higher levels of their endowment with the expectation that this will increase the 
entire pool of wealth, and that manager will reciprocate with a return transfer. Conversely. 
Employees who do not anticipate reciprocal actions are less likely to expect their manager to 
respond in kind to any transfer on their part. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
H1a: Employees with higher measures of sensitivity to reciprocity will be more likely to 
anticipate reciprocal actions when forming their decision to transfer a portion of their 
endowment to their managers, as compared to employees who are less sensitive to 
reciprocity.  
 
H1b: Employees with higher measures of sensitivity to reciprocity will be more likely to 
transfer a higher level of their initial endowment to managers than those who are less 
sensitive. 
 
Expected transfers from managers vary in their demonstrated reciprocity in response to 
the transfers received from their employees according to their measured sensitivity to reciprocity. 
I expect a positive relation between the return transfers from managers and the amount 
transferred from their employees. Furthermore, I expect managers who are more sensitive to 
reciprocity will return a higher (lower) ratio in response to higher (lower) employee transfers 
than managers who are less sensitive to reciprocity. This leads to the following hypotheses, 
which are summarized in Figure 7: 
H2a: Managers who receive a higher level of transfer from their employees will return a 
higher ratio of wealth than those who receive lower levels of transfer. 
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H2b: Managers who have higher measures of sensitivity to reciprocity and receive a 
larger portion of their employee’s endowment will transfer a higher ratio than all other 
exchange scenarios. 
 
H2c: Managers who have high measures of sensitivity to reciprocity and receive a low 
portion of their employee’s endowment will transfer a lower ratio than all other exchange 
scenarios. 
 
[Insert Figure 7 Here] 
 
Independent Variables 
 Once all survey data was collected, all participants were given an aggregate measure of 
their overall sensitivity to reciprocity on a 1 to 5 point scale ranging from 1 indicating low 
sensitivity to 5 indicating highly sensitive. For H1a and H1b this continuous measure from 1-5 
was utilized for all participants who were designated as employees. For H2a, H2b, and H2c all 
participants that were designated as managers were grouped into two categories dependent on 
their scores from the sensitivity survey. Participants were assessed to belong to one of two 
‘sensitivity to reciprocity’ levels based on a 50/50 median split, and were titled as “highly 
sensitive” or “less sensitive”.  
 The second independent variable measures the amount of endowment employees 
transferred to their managers (X1). The employee’s decision of how much of their endowment 
sent to the manager ($0.00 - $10.00) was used to create a 50/50 median split between employees 
whom were then deemed to either have sent a “high” or “low” amount of their endowment. This 
independent variable was utilized for the analysis of H2a.  
Dependent Variables 
The first dependent variable was provided by employee’s response to questions about 
their anticipation of their manager’s response, and how this anticipated response influenced their 
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transfer decision. The responses to these questions were based on a continuous 1 to 5 scale used 
to test H1a. Specifically, employees and managers responded to the two following questions: 
1.) How important was your manager’s return transfer in making your transfer decision?    
Not at all Important  
Very Unimportant 
Neither Important nor Unimportant 
Very Important 
Extremely Important 
I was not assigned to be an employee 
2.) How important was your employee's transfer in making your transfer decision? 
Not at all Important  
Very Unimportant 
Neither Important nor Unimportant 
Very Important 
Extremely Important 
I was not assigned to be an employee 
 The second dependent variable measured the amount of endowment employees 
transferred to their managers (X1). The employee’s decision of how much of their endowment 
sent to the manager ($0.00 - $10.00). This continuous variable was used to test H1b. 
 The third dependent variable was the amount of wealth managers transfer back to their 
employees, measured as a ratio of the amount transferred to them (X2/X1). This continuous 
variable was used to test H2a, H2b, and H2c.  
Understanding Checks, Manipulation Checks, Post-Experimental Questionnaire 
To determine whether participants understood key elements, they answered 
understanding checks throughout the experiment’s instructions. Specifically, participants were 
tested to make certain they understood their role as either an employee or manager and how their 
decisions would affect the final payout. Any misunderstandings about these features of the 
experiment were corrected before participants were allowed to continue to the decision round. At 
the conclusion of the experiment participants completed a post-experimental questionnaire which 
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included additional questions designed to determine the importance of various considerations in 
their decision process. Participants also answered basic demographic questions.  
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
 One hundred six students were recruited through the Virginia Commonwealth 
University’s Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments. Five participants’ were 
removed due to either a lack of ability to provide the ID information given to them in the 
preliminary survey or because they did not include an email to connect their output data. Fifty-
one percent of the remaining 101 students were female. All participants were asked multiple 
understanding check questions throughout the experiment with increasing difficulty. Participants 
were not able to move forward until they demonstrated that they understood the experimental 
procedures for the economic exchange decision they were to make and how those decisions 
affected themselves and the participant they would randomly be paired with within the room. 
After the participants demonstrated their understanding of the experiment, it was reiterated that 
this exchange would be one round of decisions and that their decisions had a direct effect on 
another participant within the room.  
 Table 9 presents the means and medians of the amounts sent by the employee and 
returned by their manager in terms of percentage of their overall available wealth. The average 
percentage of endowment available sent for those in the employee role was 55 percent (standard 
deviation = 0.277), whereas the average percentage returned by the manager was 25 percent 
(standard deviation = 0.207). These results indicate that employees, on average, were likely to 
share a little more than half of their initial endowment with their managers. Managers returned 
a quarter of what they received, which is likely due to the fact that they understood that the 
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employee in most cases already retained a portion of the wealth they were initially endowed 
with. Therefore, sending half of what managers had received was unnecessary to be equitable. 
Table 10 shows that the average profit for each participant was $10.66. 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
 Table 11 presents the aggregate scores of an individual’s sensitivity to reciprocity from 
utilizing their responses to the 14-item, 2-factor reciprocity measure. This measure was 
distributed in survey form both prior to and after the lab experiment took place. The aggregate 
score remained on a 1-5 scale measured from one indicating low sensitivity to reciprocity to five 
indicating highly sensitivity to reciprocity. The average score for the entire participant group was 
2.91 (standard deviation = 0.365). Participants in the employee role had an average of 2.92 
(standard deviation = 0.339), and participants in the manager role had an average of 2.92 
(standard deviation = 0.393). 
[Insert Table 11 Here] 
Employees’ Sensitivity to Reciprocity and Consideration of Amount Sent 
 Table 12 presents the results of the correlation between an employee’s sensitivity to 
reciprocity and their consideration of their managers subsequent action in regards to their 
decision to send a portion of their initial endowment.28 The results show that there is not a 
significant correlation between the two variables (r = 0.073, n 51, p = 0.613). Mean difference t-
test results (presented in Table 13) indicate that there was no significant difference between the 
                                                          
28 Both the reciprocity measure and the employee’s consideration of their manager was based on a 1-5 Likert scale, 1 
being very low, and 5 being very high. 
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mean consideration based on a 50/50 mean split of sensitivity to reciprocity (4.11, sd = 1.03) and 
(4.20, sd = 1.22) respectively. These results do not support Hypothesis H1a.  
[Insert Table 12 Here] 
[Insert Table 13 Here] 
Table 14 presents the results of the correlation between employees’ sensitivity to 
reciprocity and the percentage of their initial endowment that they chose to transfer to their 
managers. The results show that there is not a significant correlation between the two variables (r 
= 0.083, n = 51, p = 0.565). Mean difference t-test results (see Table 15) indicate that there was 
no significant difference between the mean transfers based on a 50/50 mean split to designate 
employees as possessing either high or low sensitivity to reciprocity (0.55, sd = 0.24) and (0.55, 
sd = 0.31), respectively. These results do not support Hypothesis H1b. 
[Insert Table 14 Here] 
[Insert Table 15 Here] 
 Table 16 presents the results of the correlation between the effect of the proportion of an 
employee’s initial endowment transferred on the manager’s decision to return a portion of their 
wealth received. The results show that there is a significant correlation between the two variables 
(r = 0.724, n 51, p < 0.001). This result supports Hypothesis H2a. 
[Insert Table 16 Here] 
 Table 17 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables of interest for hypotheses 
H2c, H2b, H2c. Across all participants chosen to act as the manager, the average percent of 
wealth returned to the employee was 26.13 percent (standard deviation = 0.2063). When 
compared to the overall average of the amount sent by those in the employee role, it seems that 
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individuals tend to keep a portion that restores some sense of equilibrium, but they allow 
themselves to still come out marginally ahead.29 
[Insert Table 17 Here] 
 Table 18 presents the test of the effect of a managers’ level of Sensitivity to Reciprocity 
and employees’ Percentage of Endowment Transferred on the Percentage Returned by their 
manager.30 The analysis indicates that the main effect of Employee % Sent significantly affects 
the percentage that managers return (F = 34.190, p < 0.001). The main effect of Manager 
Reciprocity is marginally significant (F = 3.243, p = 0.078). However, the interaction between 
Employee % and Manager Reciprocity (F = 0.428, p = 0.516) is not significant. Figure 8 
illustrates the patterns underlying the observed effects.  
[Insert Table 18 Here] 
[Insert Figure 8 Here] 
Supplementary Analysis of Trust and Distributional Fairness 
Table 19 presents the correlations for the final 14-item scale, and indicates that 12 items 
have significant correlations with the overlapping measure of reciprocity. Using these 
correlations,  additional analyses were conducted to examine if one or both of the two individual 
traits composing the two-factor reciprocity measure (trust sensitivity and distributional fairness 
sensitivity) had stronger predictive ability for the dependent variables in the study.  
[Insert Table 19 Here] 
                                                          
29 If an employee sends 50% to the manager and the manger returns 25% the final wealth received by both the 
employee and manager are $8.75 and $11.25 respectively.  
30 High and Low transfer classifications decisions use a median split where all transfers made by the employee that 
were <= 50% are classified as low and >%50 are categorized as high. Likewise, High and Low sensitivity measures 
are also classified using a median split where all scores < 3.078 are classified as having low sensitivity to reciprocity 
and all scores  >= 3.078 are classified as having high sensitivity to reciprocity 
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Table 20 and Table 21 parse out the measure of an employee’s sensitivity specifically 
towards trust and distributional fairness and their likelihood to consider reciprocal behavior of 
their paired manager. Table 20 shows the correlations found between the participants designated 
as employee’s sensitivity to trust and their subsequent consideration of their paired manager’s 
decision dependent on how much they initially transferred, from this it does not indicate that this 
measure was predictive of behavior with correlation between the two variables (r = 0.201, n = 
51, p = 0.158). Similarly, Table 21 shows the correlations found between the participants 
designated as employee’s sensitivity to distributional fairness and their subsequent consideration 
of their paired manager’s decision dependent on how much they initially transferred, from this it 
does not indicate that this measure was predictive of behavior with correlation between the two 
variables (r =  -0.208, n = 51, p = 0.143).  
[Insert Table 20 Here] 
[Insert Table 21 Here] 
Table 22 and 23 parses out the measure of an employee’s sensitivity specifically towards 
trust and distributional fairness and their initial endowment transfer to their paired manager. 
Table 22 shows the correlations found between the employees’ sensitivity to trust and their 
subsequent endowment sent, from this it does not indicate that this measure was predictive of 
behavior with correlation between the two variables (r = -0.013, n = 51, p = 0.926). Similarly, 
Table 23 shows the correlations found between the participants designated as employee’s 
sensitivity to distributional fairness and their subsequent endowment sent, from this it does not 
indicate that this measure was predictive of behavior with correlation between the two variables 
(r = 0.155, n = 51, p = 0.276).  
[Insert Table 22 Here] 
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[Insert Table 23 Here] 
Table 24 parses out the measure of a manager’s sensitivity specifically towards trust, the 
employee’s initial endowment sent, and the manager’s subsequent return transfer to their paired 
employee. The analysis indicates that the main effect of Employee % Sent significantly affects 
the percentage that managers return (F = 35.430, p < 0.001). The main effect of Distributional 
Fairness Sensitivity is marginally significant (F = 0.048, p = 0.827). However, the interaction 
between Employee % and Distributional Fairness Sensitivity (F = 0.389 p = 0.536) is not 
significant.             
[Insert Table 24 Here] 
Table 25 shows the measure of a manager’s sensitivity specifically towards distributional 
fairness, the employee’s initial endowment sent, and the manager’s subsequent return transfer to 
their paired employee. The analysis indicates that the main effect of Employee % Sent 
significantly affects the percentage that managers return (F = 35.585, p < 0.001). The main effect 
of Distributional Fairness Sensitivity is marginally significant (F = 0.138, p = 0.712). However, 
the interaction between Employee % and Distributional Fairness Sensitivity (F = 0.003, p = 
0.956) is not significant.             
 [Insert Table 25 Here] 
DISCUSSION 
 This dissertation attempted to reach further into the theory of reciprocity and the multiple 
dimensions that have formed it through previous research. However, the iterative process of 
scale development resulted in a 14-item, 2-factor model whose fit indices did not meet desired 
levels of goodness of fit. Further, this model did not exhibit predictive ability in an economic 
setting. However, this process opens a discussion as to what characteristics interact with 
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reciprocity and lays groundwork for future research in this field. The results suggest that the 
direct actions of another person appeared to have a significant impact on behavior, as is 
suggested by the significant correlation between managers’ responses to employees’ initial 
transfer.  
There was, however, some difference observed when a negative state was induced in the 
scenario. This occurred when employees sent a small portion of their endowment and managers 
who were more sensitive to reciprocity exhibited stronger negative reciprocity than managers 
who were less sensitive to reciprocity. Additional research is needed to examine the potential for 
individuals who are sensitive to reciprocity to be more demonstrative in negative interactions 
than in positive interactions. Further research is also needed to build upon the initial groundwork 
laid in this study in the effort to create a measure of individual sensitivity to reciprocity.   
Alternative explanations for the results not adhering to expectations include the number 
of participants surveyed when conducting the EFA. While previous researchers, such as Fabrigar 
et al. (1999), suggest four observations per item, others (such as Comrey and Lee 1992) suggest 
that much larger numbers are needed. Osborne (1997), for example, utilized 1,908 participants 
for a 13-item questionnaire. This indicates that numbers play a role in scale development and the 
power of the results. It may be of interest to deploy the survey on a much larger scale or with 
other populations of respondents.  
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Attribution 
 A clear area for additional research is to explore other dimensions to create a more 
comprehensive measure of an individual’s sensitivity to reciprocity. For example, examining the 
attribution dimension may add depth in replicating current and prior studies. Freud (1894) 
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describes an individuals’ ego and its ability to reject “unbearable ideas.” This may negatively 
affect one’s image of self. Simply stated, individuals may lack the ability to objectively assess 
traits or events that cause them to feel as though they have faults. Langer (1975) introduced the 
theory of the “illusion of control,” in which individuals attribute success to their own 
action/abilities, even in a scenario in which their success is determined entirely by chance. The 
dimension of attribution predicts that individuals are more likely to attribute successful outcomes 
to their own contributions or ability. Conversely, they attribute unsuccessful outcomes to outside 
sources beyond their control (Langer 1975; Ross and Sicoly 1979; Bartling and Fishbacher 
2011).  
Attribution is individuals’ perception of their contribution to an outcome. This dimension 
may be inherent in understanding reciprocity. If individuals attribute outcomes solely to their 
own performance, then they have no reason to react to other individuals’ actions. While pure 
objectivity (Floyd and Sputtek 2011; Ragin 2000, 2014) does not lend theory to individuals’ 
perception that they are entirely in control of every outcome (Langer 1975), it lends to a specific 
side of the spectrum of attribution. Specifically, if individuals have higher levels of objectivity, 
they are better able to correctly allocate their own contribution toward an outcome whether it be 
success or failure. In opposition, individuals who attribute outcome entirely to other sources 
would likely demonstrate a dysfunctional reciprocated behavior. They would incorrectly allocate 
the responsibility for success or failure either entirely to their own contribution or other 
influences.  
 Prior accounting literature on attribution theory often focuses on individuals’ “egocentric 
bias” in defining their ability to affect the success or failure of an outcome, regardless of their 
actual contribution or ability to do so (Sicoly and Ross 1977; Ross and Sicoly 1979; Thompson 
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and Kelley 1981). Early psychological works, noted that individuals are so averse to attributing 
failure to themselves that they will incorrectly recollect any outcome their ego may deem as 
“unbearable ideas that damage a psychological image of one’s self.” When outcomes are 
positive, individuals are prone to elicit an “illusion of control” in which they attribute success to 
their own talents, even under conditions in which the outcome is determined by pure chance. 
This extends to situations in which a person attributes their efforts and talent to the success of a 
group (Ross and Sicoly 1979; Thompson and Kelly 1981; Rather and Herskowitz 1977).  
The primary stream of behavioral accounting literature related to the effects of attribution 
and reciprocity is in contract negotiations. For example, an organization is looking to hire an 
employee and falsely offers the potential hire the possibility to control the outcome of their 
wage. The potential new hire will likely feel slighted due to the ruse. Given the feeling of lack of 
actual control of their outcome, the new hire provides lower levels of effort. Conversely, when 
giving subordinates actual decision power in a contract engagement, the new hires provide 
higher levels of effort. Choi (2014) demonstrated attribution of bonus offers dependent on labor 
market scarcity. New hires offered a bonus contract in a scarce labor market would attribute the 
bonus to their own importance. Conversely, new hires offered a bonus contract in a surplus labor 
market would attribute the bonus to a sign of goodwill, resulting in increased effort.  
Predicted Responses for Varying Sensitivities to Attribution 
Individuals with a negative predisposition toward attribution would not objectively 
attribute a positive outcome in situations in which their own ability had limited impact (Langer 
1975). The individual would also not accept responsibility when faced with a negative outcome 
(Ross and Sicoly 1979; Thompson and Kelley 1981). If individuals have a positive 
predisposition toward attribution, they are likely to attribute a positive outcome in situations in 
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which their ability affected the outcome. They would have the objective ability to assess their 
contributions to success or failure. If, for example, individuals have a positive predisposition, 
they will likely respond to positive or negative feedback with similar assessments of themselves. 
They can properly attribute their actions to an outcome. Figure 5 illustrates the relationship 
between an individual’s level of sensitivity to attribution and expected response to success and 
failure.  
[Insert Figure 5 Here] 
Duration 
One possible extension for the final scale would include the duration of a relationship and 
how it affects reciprocal tendencies. Due to the sheer size of the original item pool, duration was 
not included in the scale development for this dissertation. Previous works have shown 
differences in reciprocal behavior based on the length of an expected relationship between 
parties. Prior studies, especially those examining relationships between auditors, analysts, and 
management, illustrate effects due to the duration of the relationship – sometimes in the opposite 
of the predicted direction (Fisher et al. 2015). Problems arise in interpreting these results; 
however, as potential confounding effects (most notably, industry experience) may minimize the 
impact of an individual’s sensitivity to reciprocity. These issues would be critical to explore 
before developing an appropriate set of items related to the effects of relationship duration on 
reciprocal tendencies.  
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APPENDIX 1 
Initial MTurk Instrument – V 1.0 
VCU IRB PROTOCOL NUMBER: HM20013040 
 
RESEARCH PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
STUDY TITLE: Reciprocity in the Workplace: A Survey 
VCU INVESTIGATORS: Alisa Brink, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Accounting 
Kelly Green, Accounting Doctoral Candidate 
      
You are invited to participate in a research study examining reciprocity (how people respond to other 
people’s behaviors). You are being asked to participate in this study because of your current status as an 
Amazon Mechanical Turk worker. Your participation is voluntary.     
      
This survey will be conducted in one session that will last 10-15 minutes.     
·         You will accept to engage in the Amazon Mechanical Turk ‘HIT’.     
·         You will be provided a link to a survey that will allow you to engage in the survey on Qualtrics. 
    
·         You will engage in the brief survey in Qualtrics.     
·         You will receive a code provided by Qualtrics to confirm that the survey has been completed. 
    
·         Once confirmed you will receive compensation.     
·         Your total payment will be $1.50 paid through your amazon account.     
     
Workers are being hired to provide complete and thoughtful responses, researches are providing cause for 
rejecting submissions that are either incomplete or show evidence of inattentive completion.  
   
      
In the future, any information identifying you will be removed from the information you provide in this 
study. After that removal, the information could be used for other research studies by this study team 
or another researcher without asking you for additional consent.     
     
Please enter your MTurk Worker ID # to continue.     
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Survey Questions                        
If I want something from a person I dislike, I will act very nicely toward that person to get it.  
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
    
I sometimes try to make people feel guilty so that they will do what I want.     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
If I want something from someone, I ask for it directly, instead of manipulating them into giving it.  
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○      Strongly agree 
 
If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars.    
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I wouldn't cheat a person even if he or she was a real "sucker".     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I would still pay my taxes even if I would not get caught for avoiding them.     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I’d be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it.     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
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○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
It is okay to use deception to obtain information superior to that of my peers.     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
Keeping excess funds is okay so long as if would go unnoticed by my manager.     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
Use of deception is fine so long as it provides a completive advantage.      
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I am likely to distrust individuals that I have repeated negative interaction with.     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I am likely to trust individuals whom I have had extended periods of interaction with.   
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I am likely to be more honest with managers who I have had extended periods of interaction with, 
regardless of positive or negative interaction.  
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
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I am more likely to show leniency to employees whom I expect repeated interactions with.   
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
Having a high level of social status is not very important to me.     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
Having a lot of money is not especially important to me.     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I am likely to reject an offer that I feel is unfair even if I benefit.     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
Stealing office supplies is justified if my salary is unfair and knew I would not be caught.    
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I would be more likely to embezzle if I believed my salary was unfair and knew I would not be caught.  
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I am likely to exert more effort on task if my manager has shared with me a portion of the profits.   
○ ○Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
A VIEW INTO RECIPROCITY – Green 2019 
 
87 
 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I am willing to punish unfair acts even if it is at a personal loss.     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I am willing to reward acts of kindness even if it is at a personal loss.     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I believe that sharing my resources is important if it improves common welfare.     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
My own needs outweigh those of the common welfare.     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
It doesn't take much to make me angry.     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I rarely feel anger even when people treat me quite badly.     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
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Most people tend to angry more quickly than I do.      
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment rather than on careful thought.    
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I make a lot of mistakes because I don't think before I act.     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I usually stop myself before doing anything that I might later regret.     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
Sometimes I do things on impulse that turn out later to be unwise.     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I feel that my organization perceives me as untrustworthy when controls are explicitly outlined by my 
manager.     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I believe that direction outlined by my manager is intended to improve the overall success of the 
organization and employees alike.  
○ Strongly disagree 
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○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I am likely to exert more effort under circumstances in which directions are explicitly outlined by my 
manager.     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
  
I am likely to reward a coworker if I feel that they are exerting their full effort on a task. 
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I am likely to punish a coworker if I feel that they are not exerting their full effort on a task. 
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I would never accept a bribe even if it were very large.  
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods.      
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
If I were in the role of a superior I would take into consideration potential negative feedback from 
subordinates when imposing controls.         
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
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○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
 
Attention Check Questions     
     
Please select the answer "Neither agree nor disagree"     
○ Strongly disagree 
○ Disagree 
○ Neither agree nor disagree 
○ Agree 
○  Strongly agree 
 
Please select the answer Green     
○ Red 
○ Blue 
○ Yellow 
○ Green 
○ Purple 
  
 
English Proficiency Check Questions     
     
Please complete this sentence 
"I haven't got…"    
○  no brothers or sisters.     
○  brothers or sisters.     
○  any brothers or sisters.     
○  some brothers and sisters.   
   
Please select the correct phrase     
○  Always he arrives at 2:30     
○  He arrives at always 2:30     
○  He always arrives at 2:30     
○  He always at 2:30 arrives     
     
 
Demographic Questions     
     
What is your age?     
○  18-24 years old     
○  25-34 years old     
○  35-44 years old     
○  45-54 years old     
○  55-64 years old     
○  65-74 years old     
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○  75 years or older     
     
How many years of full-time work experience do you have?       
     
What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If currently enrolled, highest degree 
received.     
○  No schooling completed     
○  Elementary school to 8th grade     
○  Some high school, no diploma     
○  High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED)     
○  Some college credit, no degree     
○  Trade/technical/vocational training     
○  Associate degree     
○  Bachelor's degree     
○  Master's degree     
○  Professional degree     
     
What is your gender?    
○  Male     
○  Female     
○  Prefer not to respond     
     
Is English your first language?     
○  Yes     
○  No     
     
Completion Page     
     
Thank you for participating,     
Here is your ID : #######     
Copy this value to paste into MTurk     
When you have copied this ID, please click the next button to submit your survey.   
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APPENDIX 2 
IRB Approval Letter – Scale Development  
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APPENDIX 3 
IRB Approval Letter – Experiment 
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APPENDIX 4 
Screenshots of the Laboratory Experiment 
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FIGURE 1: Predicted Relations between Dimensions of Reciprocity 
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FIGURE 6: Churchill Methodology for Scale Development 
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FIGURE 7: Predictions for H2 
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FIGURE 8: Average % Returned by Managers 
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TABLE 1.1  
RECIPROCITY 
CITATION JOURNAL 
RESEARCH 
METHOD 
SAMPLE 
INDEPENDENT  
VARIABLES 
DEPENDENT  
VARIABLES 
KEY RESULTS 
Fisher et al. 
(2015) (1) 
Journal of 
Management 
Accounting 
Research 
1 by 3 
Between 
Subject 
60 
Undergraduate 
Students 
Interaction Conditions 
(Repeated/Reassigned/Single) 
Effort 
 In a repeated-interaction setting 
where reciprocal behavior can 
emerge for strategic reasons, we 
find that superiors set lower targets 
and that employees generally 
respond to low targets with high 
effort and to high targets with low 
effort 
Fisher et al. 
(2015) (2) 
Journal of 
Management 
Accounting 
Research 
1 by 3 
Between 
Subject 
32 
Undergraduate 
Business 
Students 
Interaction Conditions 
(Repeated/Reassigned/Single) 
Effort 
In a "cheap-talk" economic 
scenario an individual’s preference 
for reciprocity does not play a 
stronger role in a single-interaction 
target-setting scenario when 
supervisors assign lower targets 
with greater frequency. 
Ho et al.  
Accounting 
and Business 
Research 
Empirical  
Price earnings 
forecasts from 
UK-Listed 
firms. 
(I/B/E/S 
database) 
Price revisions, Stock 
Returns, Earnings forecasts 
revisions, Recommendations, 
Revisions 
Target Price 
Revisions 
Revisions are significantly more 
sensitive to negative than positive 
excess stock returns. 
Brochet et al. 
(2014) 
The 
Accounting 
Review 
Survey 
829 
CEO/CFO 
Turnover 
Observations 
CEO/CFO Turnover 
Analyst 
Migration 
CEO Turnover is associated with 
analyst migration. While this 
shows no significant comparative 
advantage for coverage for 
analysts migrating, it does show 
increased access to communication 
with managers.  
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Coletti et al. 
(2005) (1) The 
Accounting 
Review 
Two-way 
Between 
Subject 
82 
Undergraduate 
Students  
Control System (present or 
absent) 
Cooperative 
Activity 
Control systems can induce 
cooperative behavior between 
employees, which builds a trusting 
relationship for continued positive 
collaborative behavior.  
Coletti et al. 
(2005) (2) The 
Accounting 
Review 
Two-way 
Between 
Subject 
62 
Undergraduate 
and Graduate 
Students 
Control System 
Cooperative 
Activity 
Upon removing a control system 
employees are more likely to 
collaborate in subsequent rounds in 
those groups which have 
previously established trust.  
Ke and Yong 
Journal of 
Accounting 
Research 
Regression of 
Annual 
Earnings 
Forecasts 
228,904 firm-
analyst-year 
observations 
over the 
period January 
1, 1983 to 
June 30, 2000 
Analyst Bias 
Earnings 
Forecast 
Accuracy 
Analysts cater to management to 
keep job longevity. 
Matsumoto 
(2012) The 
Accounting 
Review 
Archival 
29,460 firm-
quarters from 
nonregulated 
industries 
Industry, Size, Growth, R%D 
expenses,  
Meet or Exceed 
analyst 
expectation 
forecast guidance 
Mayew (2008) 
Journal of 
Accounting 
Research 
Archival 
27,642 
quarterly 
earnings 
conference 
call transcripts 
between Jan 
2002- Dec 
2004 
Decision to buy or sell. 
Participative 
(analyst 
questions) 
Downgrades are associated with 
managers giving less private 
information 
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Youngtae et al. 
(2012) 
The 
Accounting 
Review 
Archival 
 
28,741 firm 
year 
observations 
from 1991 to 
2009 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility activity 
Earnings 
management, 
real operating 
activity 
management, 
SEC 
Investigation 
Firms that engage in CSR are less 
likely to Manage earnings, 
manipulate real operating activities 
and be subject of SEC 
investigations. 
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TABLE 1.2 
LITERATURE REVIEW - TRUST/HONESTY 
CITATION JOURNAL 
RESEARCH 
METHOD 
SAMPLE 
INDEPENDENT  
VARIABLES 
DEPENDENT  
VARIABLES 
KEY RESULTS 
Douthit and 
Stevens (2014) 
(1) The 
Accounting 
Review 
Two by Two 
Between 
Subject 
120 College 
Students 
Superior Pay and 
Factual Assertion 
Budgetary 
Slack 
Honesty plays a strong role in 
effecting budgetary slack. In 
experiment one it is shown to have a 
significant strength when 
distributional fairness is not salient 
when withholding relative superior 
pay information from a subordinate.  
Hannan (2005) 
The 
Accounting 
Review 
2 by 1 
Between 
Subject 
64 M.B.A. 
Students 
Profit Shock (Positive or 
Negative 
Effort/ Firm 
profit 
Firms that provide their employees 
with higher wages receive higher 
levels of effort. However, employees 
have asymmetric views on firm loss in 
that feel that they are entitled to share 
profits but not losses.  
Kuang and 
Moser (2009) 
(1) The 
Accounting 
Review 
1 x 2 
Between-
subject 
80 MBA. 
Students 
Contract Setting (Gift 
Exchange or Optimal 
available) 
Effort/Firm 
profit 
Although optimal contracts yield 
higher overall profit than gift 
exchange contracts, it is shown that 
employees may react negatively by 
punishing the firm even at their own 
costs due to the nonreciprocal aspects 
of the contracts. 
Kuang and 
Moser (2009) 
(2) 
The 
Accounting 
Review 
1 x 2 
Between-
subject 
40 MBA. 
Students 
Contract Setting (Gift 
Exchange and Optimal 
available) 
Effort/Firm 
profit 
When both gift exchange and optimal 
contracts are available employees are 
more likely to reject the optimal 
contracts. This leads to lower firm 
profit. Further there is some support 
showing that firms will begin to offer 
gift exchange contracts more often as 
experience is gained. 
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Kuang and 
Moser (2009) 
(3) 
The 
Accounting 
Review 
1 x 3 
Between-
subject 
40 MBA. 
Students 
Contract Setting (Gift 
Exchange, Optimal and 
Hybrid available) 
Effort/Firm 
profit 
When all three contract settings are 
available (Gift Exchange, Optimal and 
Hybrid) a market scenario takes place 
in which hybrid contracts become 
offer the best balance of welfare for 
the employees and firm profits. 
Kuang and 
Moser (2011)   
Contemporary 
Accounting 
Research 
2 x 2 
Between-
subject 
80 MBA 
Students 
Contract Type (output-
based or fixed) and 
Negotiation (present or 
not) 
Effort/Firm 
profit 
Firms are less likely to allow 
negotiation under output-based 
contract scenarios. 
  They are also more likely to accept 
counter-offers under fixed wage 
scenarios. 
 
Further, employees show higher 
efforts for those firms that match their 
wage counter-offers (engage in 
negotiation) 
 
Overall output-based contracts are less 
optimal than fixed. 
Bohner et al. 
(2001)  Journal of 
Management 
Accounting 
Research 
Cross-
Classification 
Analysis 
131 Laboratory 
Studies 
Task Type, Incentive 
Scheme, Task 
Complexity 
Performance 
Organizations must consider both 
financial and nonfinancial attributes of 
incentive schemes as financial 
initiatives do not always properly 
motivate individuals. 
Maxwell et al. 
(2003) Journal of 
Business 
Research 
2 x 2 
Between-
subject 
70 
Undergraduates 
Fairness Primer and 
Reciprocity 
Buyer offer 
and level of 
concession 
Individuals who were primed with 
fairness condition caused them to 
become more cooperative. 
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Maas (2012) 
The 
Accounting 
Review 
Quasi-
experiment 
167 Aggregate performance  
Willingness to 
obtain 
additional 
costly 
information 
(Effort) 
Managers are willing to incur costs to 
their own wealth in order to attain 
information that allows them to 
allocate bonuses to their employees 
fairly. 
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TABLE 1.3  
LITERATURE REVIEW – DISTRIBUTIONAL FAIRNESS 
CITATION JOURNAL 
RESEARCH 
METHOD 
SAMPLE 
INDEPENDENT  
VARIABLES 
DEPENDENT  
VARIABLES 
KEY RESULTS 
Douthit and 
Stevens 
(2014) (1) 
The Accounting 
Review 
Two by Two 
Between 
Subject 
120 College 
Students 
Superior Pay and 
Factual Assertion 
Budgetary Slack 
Honesty plays a strong role 
in effecting budgetary slack. 
In experiment one it is 
shown to have a significant 
strength when distributional 
fairness is not salient when 
withholding relative superior 
pay information from a 
subordinate.  
Hannan 
(2005) 
The Accounting 
Review 
2 by 1 
Between 
Subject 
64 M.B.A. 
Students 
Profit Shock 
(Positive or Negative 
Effort/ Firm 
profit 
Firms that provide their 
employees with higher 
wages receive higher levels 
of effort. However, 
employees have asymmetric 
views on firm loss in that 
feel that they are entitled to 
share profits but not losses.  
Kuang and 
Moser (2009) 
(1) 
The Accounting 
Review 
1 x 2 
Between-
subject 
80 MBA. 
Students 
Contract Setting 
(Gift Exchange or 
Optimal available) 
Effort/Firm 
profit 
Although optimal contracts 
yield higher overall profit 
than gift exchange contracts, 
it is shown that employees 
may react negatively by 
punishing the firm even at 
their own costs due to the 
nonreciprocal aspects of the 
contracts. 
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Kuang and 
Moser (2009) 
(2) 
The Accounting 
Review 
1 x 2 
Between-
subject 
40 MBA. 
Students 
Contract Setting 
(Gift Exchange and 
Optimal available) 
Effort/Firm 
profit 
When both gift exchange and 
optimal contracts are 
available employees are 
more likely to reject the 
optimal contracts. This leads 
to lower firm profit. Further 
there is some support 
showing that firms will begin 
to offer gift exchange 
contracts more often as 
experience is gained. 
Kuang and 
Moser (2009) 
(3) 
The Accounting 
Review 
1 x 3 
Between-
subject 
40 MBA. 
Students 
Contract Setting 
(Gift Exchange, 
Optimal and Hybrid 
available) 
Effort/Firm 
profit 
When all three contract 
settings are available (Gift 
Exchange, Optimal and 
Hybrid) a market scenario 
takes place in which hybrid 
contracts become offer the 
best balance of welfare for 
the employees and firm 
profits. 
Kuang and 
Moser (2011)   
Contemporary 
Accounting 
Research 
2 x 2 
Between-
subject 
80 MBA 
Students 
Contract Type 
(output-based or 
fixed) and 
Negotiation (present 
or not) 
Effort/Firm 
profit 
Firms are less likely to allow 
negotiation under output-
based contract scenarios. 
  They are also more likely to 
accept counter-offers under 
fixed wage scenarios. 
 
Further, employees show 
higher efforts for those firms 
that match their wage 
counter-offers (engage in 
negotiation) 
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Overall output-based 
contracts are less optimal 
than fixed. 
Bohner et al. 
(2001)  
Journal of 
Management 
Accounting 
Research 
Cross-
Classification 
Analysis 
131 Laboratory 
Studies 
Task Type, Incentive 
Scheme, Task 
Complexity 
Performance 
Organizations must consider 
both financial and 
nonfinancial attributes of 
incentive schemes as 
financial initiatives do not 
always properly motivate 
individuals. 
Maxwell et 
al. (2003) Journal of 
Business 
Research 
2 x 2 
Between-
subject 
70 
Undergraduates 
Fairness Primer and 
Reciprocity 
Buyer offer and 
level of 
concession 
Individuals who were primed 
with fairness condition 
caused them to become more 
cooperative. 
Maas (2012) 
The Accounting 
Review 
Quasi-
experiment 
167 
Aggregate 
performance  
Willingness to 
obtain 
additional 
costly 
information 
(Effort) 
Managers are willing to 
incur costs to their own 
wealth in order to attain 
information that allows them 
to allocate bonuses to their 
employees fairly. 
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TABLE 1.4 
LITERATURE REVIEW - INTENTION 
CITATION JOURNAL 
RESEARCH 
METHOD 
SAMPLE 
INDEPENDENT  
VARIABLES 
DEPENDENT  
VARIABLES 
KEY RESULTS 
Fisher et al. 
(2015) (1) 
Journal of 
Management 
Accounting 
Research 
1 by 3 
Between 
Subject 
60 
Undergraduate 
Students 
Interaction Conditions 
(Repeated/Reassigned/Single) 
Effort 
 In a repeated-
interaction setting 
where reciprocal 
behavior can emerge 
for strategic reasons, 
we find that 
superiors set lower 
targets and that 
employees generally 
respond to low 
targets with high 
effort and to high 
targets with low 
effort 
Fisher et al. 
(2015) (2) 
Journal of 
Management 
Accounting 
Research 
1 by 3 
Between 
Subject 
32 
Undergraduate 
Business 
Students 
Interaction Conditions 
(Repeated/Reassigned/Single) 
Effort 
In a "cheap-talk" 
economic scenario 
an individual’s 
preference for 
reciprocity does not 
play a stronger role 
in a single-
interaction target-
setting scenario 
when supervisors 
assign lower targets 
with greater 
frequency. 
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Ho et al.  
Accounting 
and Business 
Research 
Empirical  
Price earnings 
forecasts from 
UK-Listed 
firms. (I/B/E/S 
database) 
Price revisions, Stock Returns, 
Earnings forecasts revisions, 
Recommendations, Revisions 
Target Price 
Revisions 
Revisions are 
significantly more 
sensitive to negative 
than positive excess 
stock returns. 
Brochet et 
al. (2014) 
The 
Accounting 
Review 
Survey 
829 CEO/CFO 
Turnover 
Observations 
CEO/CFO Turnover 
Analyst 
Migration 
CEO Turnover is 
associated with 
analyst migration. 
While this shows no 
significant 
comparative 
advantage for 
coverage for analysts 
migrating, it does 
show increased 
access to 
communication with 
managers.  
Coletti et al. 
(2005) (1) 
The 
Accounting 
Review 
Two-way 
Between 
Subject 
82 
Undergraduate 
Students  
Control System (present or 
absent) 
Cooperative 
Activity 
Control systems can 
induce cooperative 
behavior between 
employees, which 
builds a trusting 
relationship for 
continued positive 
collaborative 
behavior.  
Coletti et al. 
(2005) (2) The 
Accounting 
Review 
Two-way 
Between 
Subject 
62 
Undergraduate 
and Graduate 
Students 
Control System 
Cooperative 
Activity 
Upon removing a 
control system 
employees are more 
likely to collaborate 
in subsequent rounds 
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in those groups 
which have 
previously 
established trust.  
Ke and 
Yong 
Journal of 
Accounting 
Research 
Regression of 
Annual 
Earnings 
Forecasts 
228,904 firm-
analyst-year 
observations 
over the period 
January 1, 1983 
to June 30, 2000 
Analyst Bias 
Earnings 
Forecast 
Accuracy 
Analysts cater to 
management to keep 
job longevity. 
Matsumoto 
(2012) The 
Accounting 
Review 
Archival 
29,460 firm-
quarters from 
nonregulated 
industries 
Industry, Size, Growth, R%D 
expenses,  
Meet or Exceed 
analyst 
expectation 
forecast guidance 
Mayew 
(2008) 
Journal of 
Accounting 
Research 
Archival 
27,642 quarterly 
earnings 
conference call 
transcripts 
between Jan 
2002- Dec 2004 
Decision to buy or sell. 
Participative 
(analyst 
questions) 
Downgrades are 
associated with 
managers giving less 
private information 
Youngtae et 
al. (2012) 
The 
Accounting 
Review 
Archival 
 
28,741 firm year 
observations 
from 1991 to 
2009 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility activity 
Earnings 
management, 
real operating 
activity 
management, 
SEC 
Investigation 
Firms that engage in 
CSR are less likely 
to Manage earnings, 
manipulate real 
operating activities 
and be subject of 
SEC investigations. 
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TABLE 1.5 
LITERATURE REVIEW - ATTRIBUTION 
CITATION JOURNAL 
RESEARCH 
METHOD 
SAMPLE 
INDEPENDENT  
VARIABLES 
DEPENDENT  
VARIABLES 
KEY RESULTS 
Douthit and 
Stevens 
(2014) (2) 
The 
Accounting 
Review 
Two by Two 
Between 
Subject 
120 College 
Students 
 
Salary Authority 
and Factual 
Assertion 
Budgetary 
Slack 
In experiment two, honesty 
is shown to have a 
significant effect on 
budgetary slack when 
reciprocity is made salient 
in the form of a superiors' 
ability to reject a 
subordinates' budgetary 
proposal. 
Christ 
(2013) (1) 
Journal of 
Management 
Accounting 
Research 
3 by 2 by 2 
Experimental 
108 Graduate 
Accounting 
Students 
Source of Control, 
Control Existence, 
Feedback 
Effort 
Source of control affects 
reciprocity in the form of 
an employee’s effort levels. 
Higher saliency of the 
source of control is met 
with more intense reactions 
from employees whom the 
control is imposed.  
Christ 
(2013) (2) 
Journal of 
Management 
Accounting 
Research 
3 by 2 by 2 
Experimental 
106 Graduate 
Accounting 
Students 
Source of Control, 
Control Existence, 
Feedback 
Effort 
Managers who entrust their 
employees with more 
resources are met with 
positive reciprocity in the 
form of employees 
returning more points 
(measured as effort) 
Choi (2014) 
The 
Accounting 
Review 
2 by 2 Fully 
Crossed 
201 
Undergraduate 
Students 
Labor Market & 
Signing Bonus 
Option 
Effort 
Employees offered a 
signing bonus in the 
presence of an excess 
workforce environment 
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perceive higher trust and 
thereby increase effort.  
Christ, et al. 
(2012) 
The 
Accounting 
Review 
2 by 2 plus 1 
Between-
subjects 
220 Graduate 
and 
Undergraduate 
Students 
Contract Frame & 
Contract 
Implementation 
Effort 
Trust is reciprocal, 
specifically it is found that 
penalty contract structures 
engender greater distrust 
between principals and 
agents than do bonus 
contracts. 
Christ and 
Vance 
(2018) 
Accounting, 
Organizations 
and Society 
2 by 2 
Between-
subjects 
323 U.S. 
Participants 
From Amazon's 
Mechanical 
Turk 
Management 
Orientation 
(trust/control) & 
Manager's Incentive 
Frame 
Effort to Help 
or Harm 
Manager 
In addition to showing that 
penalty contracts can elicit 
lower levels of effort from 
employees, penalty 
contracts coupled with a 
poor manager/employee 
relationship can cause 
employees to actively harm 
their managers, even at 
their own detriment. 
Schatzberg 
and Stevens 
(2008) 
Journal of 
Accounting 
Research 
Two-treatment 
split-plot 
factorial 
design 
96 MBA 
Students 
Rejection Power, 
Pair Rotation, and 
Experience level of 
producer 
Budgetary 
Slack & Effort 
Manager power to reject 
budgetary requests reduces 
budgetary slack by 50%, 
and also establishes an 
expectation of reciprocity 
in which allowing more 
budgetary slack in turn 
increases effort of 
employees.  
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TABLE 1.6  
NEGOTIATION 
CITATION JOURNAL 
RESEARCH 
METHOD 
SAMPLE 
INDEPENDENT  
VARIABLES 
DEPENDENT  
VARIABLES 
KEY RESULTS 
Hatfield, 
Agolglia and 
Sanchez 
(2008) (1) 
Journal of 
Accounting 
Research 
2 by 2 
Between-
subjects 
60 Audit 
Managers 
and Partners  
Client 
Negotiation 
Strategy and 
Client Retentions 
Decision to waive 
or post adjustment, 
determining 
reciprocity-based 
strategy. 
In situations in which 
management's negotiation strategy 
is competitive and client retention 
risk is high, auditors are more likely 
to utilize a reciprocity-based 
strategy.  
Hatfield, 
Agolglia and 
Sanchez 
(2008) (2) 
Journal of 
Accounting 
Research 
2 by 1 
Between-
subjects 
44 Audit 
Managers 
Auditor 
Negotiation 
Strategy 
Negotiation goals, 
limits, and 
counteroffers 
Use of a reciprocity-based strategy 
can result in more conservative 
statements, by reducing perceived 
client pressures to waive or reduce 
proposed adjustments therefore 
increasing financial statement 
quality. 
Hatfield and 
Mullis. (2010) 
The 
Accounting 
Review 
2x2 Between 
subject Case 
Study - 
Delivered by 
Cover Letter 
and USB 
Drive 
40 Partners, 
60 
Managers, 
and 2 Senior 
auditors 
Magnitude of 
audit difference,  
client concession 
Negotiation limits 
Auditors propose smaller 
adjustments when the magnitude of 
the audit difference is high and 
when the client conceded on an 
audit issue prior to resolving the 
difference in estimates.  
Hatfield and 
Mullis. (2015) 
Accounting 
Matters 
Empirical  
Prior 
research in 
psychology 
and social 
psychology 
n/a n/a 
Designed model illustrating that 
audit quality and financial statement 
quality is mediated by Auditor-
Client Management Negotiations 
(ACM) 
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Sanchez et al. 
(2007) (1) 
The 
Accounting 
Review 
1 x3 
Between-
subject 
124 
Controllers 
and CFOs 
Concession 
approach 
Client's 
Willingness to post 
accounting 
adjustments. Client 
satisfaction & 
retention 
Clients are more willing to post 
sales adjustments when concession 
approaches are utilized. Clients 
show higher levels of satisfaction 
and retention rates when concession 
approaches are utilized. 
Sanchez et al. 
(2007) (2) 
The 
Accounting 
Review 
1 x3 
Between-
subject 
36 Audit 
Managers 
Concession 
approach 
Auditor 
perceptions 
Auditors believe that it is 
appropriate to adjust their 
negotiation tactics in order to 
increase customer satisfaction and 
facilitation of posting significant 
adjustments. 
Fu et al. (2011) 
Auditing: A 
Journal of 
Practice and 
Theory 
2 by 2 
Between-
subjects 
99 Managers 
and Partners 
from China 
Negotiation style 
(collaborative vs. 
contentious) & 
Negotiation 
Experience 
Amount of a 
proposed audit 
adjustment relating 
to an impairment 
loss believed to 
ultimately be 
recorded. 
Negotiation experience leads to 
higher perceived write-downs; this 
is consistent whether a collaborative 
or a contentious client negotiation 
style is employed. Negotiation style 
does however have an effect when 
the auditor is less experienced. 
Kerler and 
Killough Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Experimental 
Case 
89 
Professional 
auditors 
Auditors 
satisfaction with 
prior client 
engagement.  
Auditors trust and 
subsequent 
perceived risk. 
An auditors' satisfaction with their 
client affects trust in the client. i.e. 
higher levels of satisfaction are 
associated with higher levels of 
trust, and vice versa. 
Gibbins et al. 
(2001) 
Journal of 
Accounting 
Research 
Survey 
132 Public 
Audit Firms 
Negotiation 
Issue/Context/Co
nstraint 
Outcome Context 
Negotiation process affects 
financial statements materially, and 
this is a normal part of auditing 
practice where two parties must 
reach an agreement. Auditor-client 
relationship affects potential 
changes to financial statements. 
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Shaub (1996) 
Behavioral 
Research in 
Accounting 
Questionnaire 
119 Senior 
and 
Managers 
from KPMG 
Experience, 
Incentive, 
Communication 
Trustworthiness, 
Independence 
Experience and situational factors 
dominate measure of perceived 
trustworthiness and auditor 
independence. 
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TABLE 2 
Dimensions of Reciprocity 
Dimension of 
Reciprocity 
 
Quotes from Previous Literature Defining Sub- 
Dimension 
 
Previous Behavioral 
Experiments Used for 
Item Development 
Distributional 
Fairness 
 "Fairness equilibrium"  Douthit and Stevens 
(2015) 
     
Trust 
 
“Trust is a type of expectation that alleviates the fear 
that one's exchange partner will act 
opportunistically” -Bradach and Eccles (1989) 
 
Antle and Eppens (1985) 
Evans et al. (2001)  
Ke and Yu (2006)  
Ho et al. (2018)  
Schatzberg and Stevens 
(2008) 
  
“The cognitive element in trust is characterized by a 
cognitive "leap" beyond the expectations that reason 
and experience alone would warrant” - Lewis and 
Weigert (1985) 
 
  
"The extent to which negotiations are fair and 
commitments are upheld" - Anderson and Narus 
(1990) 
  
  
"An innate personal characteristic reflecting one's 
preference for upholding some social norm of 
behavior, regardless of economic incentives." - 
Coletti et. al (2005) 
  
Opposite of 
Honesty 
(Agency Theory) 
 
"The excess of resources allocated over the 
minimum necessary to accomplish the tasks 
assigned" 
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Intention 
 
"How the agent perceives the principal’s decision to 
control and how this affects the age behavior" 
 
Christ (2013) 
Douthit (2017) 
Douthit and Stevens 
(2015) 
Fisher (2015) 
Linderbaum and Levy 
(2010) 
Schatzberg and Stevens 
(2008) 
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TABLE 3 
 
RECIPROCITY SCALE AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR ADMINISTRATION 
 
Statements below are ones that participants would potentially use to describe behavior they are either likely or unlikely to engage in. Please circle 
responses that would indicate if you agree or disagree with level of agreement you relate to each statement. It is requested that you do not spend too 
much on any particular item. Please keep in mind that there are no correct or incorrect answers merely your feelings on each statement. 31 
                   
# Source Citation Primary Construct  
 1= Disagree Very Strongly, 2 = Disagree Strongly, 3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree, 4 = Agree Strongly,  5 = Agree Very Strongly 
1 HEXACO  Trust - If I want something from a person I dislike, I will act very nicely toward that person in  order to get it.
      1 2 3 4 5 
2 HEXACO  Trust - I don't see anything wrong with using flattery to get ahead in life.    
     1 2 3 4 5  
3 HEXACO  Trust - I sometimes try to make people feel guilty so that they will do what I want.   
     1 2 3 4 5  
4 HEXACO  Trust + I wouldn't use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if I thought it would succeed. 
     1 2 3 4 5  
5 HEXACO  Trust - If I want something from someone, I will laugh at that person's worst jokes.   
     1 2 3 4 5  
6 HEXACO  Trust + I wouldn't pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me.   
     1 2 3 4 5  
7 HEXACO  Trust + If I want something from someone, I ask for it directly, instead of manipulating them into giving it.
      1 2 3 4 5  
                                                          
31 Initially this was formatted in a way that could be distributed to accounting students within the Intermediate Accounting courses, but I was unable to fit within the 
course scheduling 
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8 HEXACO  Trust - If I want something from someone, I ask for it directly, instead of manipulating them into giving it.
      1 2 3 4 5  
9 HEXACO  Trust - If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars.  
     1 2 3 4 5  
10 HEXACO  Trust + I wouldn't cheat a person even if he or she was a real "sucker".     
     1 2 3 4 5  
11 HEXACO  Trust - I wouldn't feel bad about deceiving people who allow themselves to be deceived.   
     1 2 3 4 5  
12 HEXACO  Trust - I would be tempted to buy stolen property if I were financially tight.    
     1 2 3 4 5  
13 HEXACO  Trust + I would still pay my taxes even if I would not get caught for avoiding them.   
     1 2 3 4 5  
14 HEXACO  Trust + I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large.      
     1 2 3 4 5  
15 HEXACO  Trust - I would like to know how to smuggle things across the border.     
     1 2 3 4 5  
16 HEXACO  Trust  I’d be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it.   
     1 2 3 4 5  
17 HEXACO  Distributional Fairness + Having a high level of social status is not very important to me.   
       1 2 3 4 5  
18 HEXACO  Distributional Fairness + Having a lot of money is not especially important to me.    
       1 2 3 4 5  
19 HEXACO  Distributional Fairness - I prefer to have high-status, successful people as my friends.   
       1 2 3 4 5  
20 HEXACO  Distributional Fairness - I would like to live in a very expensive, high-class neighborhood.  
       1 2 3 4 5  
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21 HEXACO  Distributional Fairness - I would like to be seen driving around in a very expensive car.   
       1 2 3 4 5  
22 HEXACO  Distributional Fairness - I would enjoy being a member of a fancy, high-class casino.   
       1 2 3 4 5  
23 HEXACO  Distributional Fairness - I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods.  
       1 2 3 4 5  
24 HEXACO  Distributional Fairness - If there is some chance of improving my social status, I take big risks.  
       1 2 3 4 5  
25 HEXACO  Attribution - I deserve more influence and authority than most other people do.   
       1 2 3 4 5  
26 HEXACO  Attribution + I am an ordinary person who is no better than others.     
       1 2 3 4 5  
27 HEXACO  Attribution + I wouldn’t want people to treat me as though I were superior to them.   
       1 2 3 4 5  
28 HEXACO  Attribution - I am special and superior in many ways.       
       1 2 3 4 5  
29 HEXACO  Attribution - Sometimes I feel that laws should not apply to someone like me.    
       1 2 3 4 5  
30 HEXACO  Attribution - I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is.   
       1 2 3 4 5  
31 HEXACO  Attribution - Some people would say that I have an over-inflated ego.     
       1 2 3 4 5  
32 HEXACO  Attribution - I want people to know that I am an important person of high status.   
       1 2 3 4 5  
33 HEXACO  Intention - It doesn’t take much to make me angry.       
       1 2 3 4 5  
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34 HEXACO  Intention - People think of me as someone who has a quick temper.     
       1 2 3 4 5  
35 HEXACO  Intention + I rarely feel anger, even when people treat me quite badly.    
       1 2 3 4 5  
36 HEXACO  Intention + Most people tend to get angry more quickly than I do.     
       1 2 3 4 5  
37 HEXACO  Intention + Some people say that they have never seen me angry.     
       1 2 3 4 5  
38 HEXACO  Intention - I find it hard to keep my temper when people insult me.     
       1 2 3 4 5  
39 HEXACO  Intention - I react very angrily if I find that someone is trying to cheat me.    
       1 2 3 4 5  
40 HEXACO  Intention + People can approach me without having to worry about the mood I’m in.   
       1 2 3 4 5  
41 HEXACO  Intention + People say that I am good at controlling my impulses.     
       1 2 3 4 5  
42 HEXACO  Intention - I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment rather than on careful thought. 
       1 2 3 4 5  
43 HEXACO  Intention - I make a lot of mistakes because I don't think before I act.    
       1 2 3 4 5  
44 HEXACO  Intention + I don’t allow my impulses to govern my behavior.     
       1 2 3 4 5  
45 HEXACO  Intention + I think carefully before doing anything that might be unsafe or unhealthy.  
       1 2 3 4 5  
46 HEXACO  Intention + I usually stop myself before doing anything that I might later regret.   
       1 2 3 4 5  
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47 HEXACO  Intention - Sometimes I do things on impulse that turn out later to be unwise.   
       1 2 3 4 5  
48 HEXACO  Intention - I prefer to do whatever comes to mind, rather than stick to a plan.   
       1 2 3 4 5  
49 Christ 2013 JMAR Intention (-/+) I am likely to exert less(more) effort under circumstances in which process controls are(are not) 
explicitly outlined by my direct superior             
       1 2 3 4 5  
50 Christ 2013 JMAR Intention (-/+) I am likely to exert less(more) effort under circumstances in which I have more 
direction(freedom) provided in completing tasks.           
       1 2 3 4 5  
51 Christ 2013 JMAR Intention - I feel that my organization perceives me as untrustworthy when controls are explicitly outlined 
by my superior.                
       1 2 3 4 5  
52 Christ 2013 JMAR Intention (+/-) I believe that controls outlined by my organization(supervisor) are intended to improve the 
overall success of the organization and employees alike.           
       1 2 3 4 5  
53 Christ 2013 JMAR Intention + I believe that freedom provided by my organization that are consistent over time are intended to 
improve the overall success of the organization and employees alike   
        1 2 3 4 5  
54 Christ 2013 JMAR Intention - I believe that controls outlined by my organization that are consistent over time are intended to 
improve the overall success of the organization and employees alike         
        1 2 3 4 5  
55 Christ 2013 JMAR Intention + I believe that freedoms outlined by my direct superior that are consistent over time are intended 
to improve the overall success of the organization and employees alike         
        1 2 3 4 5  
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56 Christ 2013 JMAR Intention - I believe that controls outlined by my direct superior that are consistent over time are intended 
to improve the overall success of the organization and employees alike         
        1 2 3 4 5  
57 Christ 2013 JMAR Intention + I believe that as a superior, I take into consideration potential negative feedback from 
subordinates when imposing controls   
        1 2 3 4 5  
58 Christ 2013 JMAR Trust + I believe that as a superior, I generally expect subordinates to act in the best interest of the organization
      
        1 2 3 4 5  
59 Christ 2013 JMAR Trust - I believe that as a superior, I generally expect subordinates to act in their own best interests 
      
        1 2 3 4 5  
60 Choi 2014 TAR Attribution + I feel that a bonus is a sign of trust from my organization regardless of my individual 
performance           
1 2 3 4 5  
61 Choi 2014 TAR Attribution + I feel that a bonus is a sign of trust when my organization is doing well financially 
         
        1 2 3 4 5  
62 Choi 2014 TAR Attribution - I feel that I am entitled to a bonus for periods in which my organization performs well 
        
        1 2 3 4 5  
63 Choi 2014 TAR Attribution - I feel that I am entitled to a bonus for periods in which I perform well.   
        
        1 2 3 4 5  
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64 Choi 2014 TAR Attribution - I feel that I am entitled to a bonus for periods in which I perform well, despite the organizations 
overall performance.     
        1 2 3 4 5  
65 Choi 2014 TAR Attribution + I feel that a bonus received during periods in which my organization does not perform well is 
an indication of trust.     
1 2 3 4 5  
66 Choi 2014 TAR Attribution + I feel that I should not receive a raise for periods in which the organization performs poorly
         
1 2 3 4 5  
67 Choi 2014 TAR Attribution + I feel that bonuses are given solely as a measure of my personal performance  
          
1 2 3 4 5  
68 Choi 2014 TAR Attribution - I feel that bonuses are given as a measure of my effect on the organizations’ performance as a 
whole        
1 2 3 4 5  
69 Douthit and Stevens 2015 TAR Distributional Fairness + If my direct superior endows me with a portion of the profits gained by 
a project I am likely to exert more effort   
1 2 3 4 5  
70 Douthit and Stevens 2015 TAR Intention -/+ I am(not) often suspicious that exchanges offered to me are actually in my best 
interest.      
1 2 3 4 5  
71 Douthit and Stevens 2015 TAR Intention - I believe that there is no such thing as a free meal   
       1 2 3 4 5  
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72 Douthit and Stevens 2015 TAR Distributional Fairness -/+ I am likely to reject(accept) an offer that I feel is unfairly distributed 
even if I am benefiting     
        1 2 3 4 5  
73 Douthit and Stevens 2015 TAR Distributional Fairness -/+ I am likely to reject(accept) an offer that I feel the other party is 
receiving a greater share, even if I am benefiting.            
        1 2 3 4 5  
74 Douthit and Stevens 2015 TAR Distributional Fairness + I am likely to accept an offer knowing that it may be unfairly 
distributed as long as I benefit marginally    
        1 2 3 4 5  
75 Douthit and Stevens 2015 TAR Distributional Fairness - I would be more likely to steal office supplies if I believed my salary 
was unfair and knew would not be caught.   
        1 2 3 4 5  
76 Douthit and Stevens 2015 TAR Distributional Fairness - I would be more likely to embezzle if I believed my salary was unfair 
and knew would not be caught.    
        1 2 3 4 5  
77 Schatzberg & Stevens 2008  Trust +/- I am likely to exert more(less) effort on a task if my superior has given me more(less) 
freedom to complete my task  
        1 2 3 4 5  
78 Schatzberg & Stevens 2008  Distributional Fairness +/- I am likely to exert more(less) effort on a task if my superior has 
shared with me a higher(lower) share of profits from activity  
        1 2 3 4 5  
79 Schatzberg & Stevens 2008  Intention I am likely to exert more(less) effort on a task if my superior has(does not have) the 
ability to punish me directly.   
        1 2 3 4 5  
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80 Schatzberg & Stevens 2008  Trust +/- I am likely to exert equal levels of effort on a task regardless of my superiors the ability 
to punish me directly.  
        1 2 3 4 5  
81 Schatzberg & Stevens 2008  Trust ? I am likely to reward(punish) an employee if I feel that they are (are not) exerting their 
full effort on a task  
        1 2 3 4 5  
82 Fisher et al. (2015) JMAR Time? + I am likely to trust individuals that I have repeated positive interactions with  
            
1 2 3 4 5 
83 Fisher et al. (2015) JMAR Time? - I am likely to distrust individuals that I have repeated negative interactions with  
        
1 2 3 4 5 
84 Fisher et al. (2015) JMAR Time? + I am likely to entrust subordinates who I have had extended periods of interaction with 
        
1 2 3 4 5 
85 Fisher et al. (2015) JMAR Time? + I am likely to be more honest with superiors who I have had extended periods of interaction 
with regardless of positive or negative interaction           
       
1 2 3 4 5 
86 Fisher et al. (2015) JMAR Time? + I am more likely to show leniency to subordinates whom I expect repeated interactions with 
       
1 2 3 4 5 
87 Fisher et al. (2015) JMAR Time? + I am more likely to give higher levels of efforts for superiors whom I expect repeated 
interactions with               
      1 2 3 4 5 
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88 Linderbaum and Levy (2010) JOM Intention + Feedback contributes to my success at work. 
       1 2 3 4 5 
89 Linderbaum and Levy (2010) JOM Intention + To develop my skills at work, I rely on feedback.    
       1 2 3 4 5 
90 Linderbaum and Levy (2010) JOM Intention + Feedback is critical for improving performance.     
       1 2 3 4 5 
91 Linderbaum and Levy (2010) JOM Intention + Feedback from supervisors can help me advance in a company.  
       
1 2 3 4 5  
92 Linderbaum and Levy (2010) JOM Intention + I find that feedback is critical for reaching my goals.   
       
       1 2 3 4 5  
93 Linderbaum and Levy (2010) JOM Attribution + It is my responsibility to apply feedback to improve my performance. 
     
       1 2 3 4 5  
94 Linderbaum and Levy (2010) JOM Attribution + I hold myself accountable to respond to feedback appropriately.   
       1 2 3 4 5  
95 Linderbaum and Levy (2010) JOM Attribution + I don’t feel a sense of closure until I respond to feedback.   
       1 2 3 4 5  
96 Linderbaum and Levy (2010) JOM Attribution + If my supervisor gives me feedback, it is my responsibility to respond to it.
       
1 2 3 4 5  
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97 Linderbaum and Levy (2010) JOM Attribution + I feel obligated to make changes based on feedback.   
       
       1 2 3 4 5  
98 Linderbaum and Levy (2010) JOM Attribution + I feel self-assured when dealing with negative feedback.   
    
       1 2 3 4 5  
99 Linderbaum and Levy (2010) JOM Attribution + Compared to others, I am more competent at handling negative feedback. 
       1 2 3 4 5  
100 Linderbaum and Levy (2010) JOM Attribution + I believe that I have the ability to deal with negative feedback effectively. 
       1 2 3 4 5  
101 Linderbaum and Levy (2010) JOM Attribution + I feel confident when responding objectively to both positive and negative 
feedback.  
       1 2 3 4 5  
102 Linderbaum and Levy (2010) JOM Attribution + I know that I can handle positive or negative feedback that I receive 
objectively.        
       1 2 3 4 5  
103 Ke and Yu (2006) JAR Trust - I would be likely to bias my decisions in order to increase my ability to obtain superior 
information       
1 2 3 4 5  
104 Ke and Yu (2006) JAR Trust - I would not bias my decision if doing so protected my employment   
        
1 2 3 4 5  
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105 Ke and Yu (2006) JAR Trust + It is never okay to bias a decision if I know that it is misleading    
       
1 2 3 4 5  
106 Ho et al. (2018)  Trust - I would be likely to revise a decision if my original stance affected my employment security. 
       
       1 2 3 4 5  
107 Ho et al. (2018)  Trust - It is ethical to give misleading information so long as it provides job security.   
    
       1 2 3 4 5  
108 Ho et al. (2018)  Trust - It is okay to revise my decision to one that is dishonest so long as others do as well.  
  
       1 2 3 4 5  
109 Ho et al. (2018)  Trust - It is ethical to give misleading information so long as my employer benefits.   
       
1 2 3 4 5  
110 Ho et al. (2018)  Trust - It is okay to give misleading information so long as there is a consensus with other decision makers.
        
1 2 3 4 5  
111 Evans (2001)  Trust -/+ It is (never)okay to keep excess resources when making budgetary decisions even without potential of 
being punished by my superior.             
       1 2 3 4 5  
112 Evans (2001)  Trust - Requesting additional funding is fine as long as there is no potential for disciplinary action 
        
1 2 3 4 5  
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113 Evans (2001)  Trust + Keeping excess budget is not ethical even if doing so would go unnoticed by my supervisor. 
     
       1 2 3 4 5  
114 Evans (2001)  Trust - Keeping excess budget is ethical if I feel that my supervisor does not trust me.   
  
       1 2 3 4 5  
115 Evans (2001)  Trust - Keeping excess funds from my organization is fine as long as supervisor review allows. 
       1 2 3 4 5  
116 Evans (2001)  Trust + Keeping excess funds from my organization is not ethical even if supervisor review allows. 
       
1 2 3 4 5  
117 Douthit (2017)  Intention  I am likely to act more honestly if I know that my superior is able to increase his level of 
oversight        
       1 2 3 4 5  
118 Lowe and Recker (1994)            
    Attribution  I am(am not) likely to assign blame to others if I am aware that an outcome was negative. 
     
1 2 3 4 5  
119 Lowe and Recker (1994)            
    Attribution  Outcomes outweigh the means 
      
1 2 3 4 5  
120 Lowe and Recker (1994)            
    Attribution  I agree with the statement "no harm, no foul" 
1 2 3 4 5  
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121 Fehr and Gachter (1993) 
    Distributional Fairness I am willing to punish unfair acts even if it is at a personal loss    
  
1 2 3 4 5  
122 Fehr and Gachter (1993) 
    Distributional Fairness I am willing to reward acts of kindness even if it is at a personal loss 
      
1 2 3 4 5  
123 Fehr and Gachter (1993) 
    Distributional Fairness I believe that sharing my resources is important if it improves common welfare 
       1 2 3 4 5  
124 Fehr and Gachter (1993) 
    Distributional Fairness My own needs outweigh those of common welfare 
     
1 2 3 4 5  
125 Fehr and Gachter (1993) 
    Distributional Fairness Altruism is necessary for general well-being of society. 
      
1 2 3 4 5  
126 Fehr and Gachter (1993) 
    Distributional Fairness Pure altruism does not exist in real practice. 
     
1 2 3 4 5  
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TABLE 4 
List of 45 Items for the Initial Q-Sort Task 
 
Dimension Question 
Trust 
 
If I want something from a person I dislike, I will act very nicely toward that person to get it. 
Trust I sometimes try to make people feel guilty so that they will do what I want. 
Trust 
 
If I want something from someone, I ask for it directly, instead of manipulating them into 
giving it. 
Trust If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars. 
Trust I wouldn't cheat a person even if he or she was a real "sucker". 
Trust I would still pay my taxes even if I would not get caught for avoiding them. 
Trust I’d be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it. 
Trust It is okay to use deception to obtain information superior to that of my peers. 
Trust Keeping excess funds is okay so long as if would go unnoticed by my manager. 
Trust Use of deception is fine so long as it provides a completive advantage.  
Trust I am likely to distrust individuals that I have repeated negative interaction with. 
Trust I am likely to trust individuals whom I have had extended periods of interaction with. 
Trust I am likely to be more honest with managers who I have had extended periods of interaction 
with, regardless of positive or negative interaction. 
Trust I am more likely to show leniency to employees whom I expect repeated interactions with. 
Distributional Fairness Having a high level of social status is not very important to me. 
Distributional Fairness Having a lot of money is not especially important to me. 
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Distributional Fairness I am likely to reject an offer that I feel is unfair even if I benefit. 
Distributional Fairness Stealing office supplies is justified if my salary is unfair and knew I would not be caught. 
Distributional Fairness I would be more likely to embezzle if I believed my salary was unfair and knew I would not 
be caught. 
Distributional Fairness I am likely to exert more effort on task if my manager has shared with me a portion of the 
profits. 
Distributional Fairness I am willing to punish unfair acts even if it is at a personal loss. 
Distributional Fairness I am willing to reward acts of kindness even if it is at a personal loss. 
Distributional Fairness I believe that sharing my resources is important if it improves common welfare. 
Distributional Fairness My own needs outweigh those of the common welfare. 
Intention It doesn't take much to make me angry. 
Intention I rarely feel anger even when people treat me quite badly. 
Intention Most people tend to angry more quickly than I do.  
Intention I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment rather than on careful thought. 
Intention I make a lot of mistakes because I don't think before I act. 
Intention I usually stop myself before doing anything that I might later regret. 
Intention Sometimes I do things on impulse that turn out later to be unwise. 
Intention I feel that my organization perceives me as untrustworthy when controls are explicitly 
outlined by my manager. 
Intention I believe that direction outlined by my manager is intended to improve the overall success of 
the organization and employees alike. 
A VIEW INTO RECIPROCITY – Green 2019 
 
151 
 
Intention I am likely to exert more effort under circumstances in which directions are explicitly 
outlined by my manager. 
Attribution I hold myself accountable to respond too feedback appropriately. 
Attribution I feel obligated to make change based on feedback. 
Attribution I believe that I can deal with negative feedback objectively. 
Attribution I feel self-assured when dealing with negative feedback. 
Attribution I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is. 
Attribution I feel that I am entitled to a bonus for periods in which I perform well. 
Attribution I feel that bonuses are given solely as a measure of my personal performance. 
Attribution I feel that bonuses are given as a measure of my contribution towards my organizations 
overall success. 
Attribution I am special and superior in many ways. 
Attribution Sometimes I feel that laws should not apply to someone like me. 
Attribution I am likely to assign blame to others if I am aware that an outcome that is negative. 
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TABLE 5 
 
Factor Loadings from EFA Principal Components Analysis with oblique Rotation 
 
MTurk Survey EFA results: Round 1 
Item  Factor Loadings: 
Each item indicated with a ‘*’ was utilized in the final 2 
factor measure.  
 
 N = 166   Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 
Trust/Honesty Q#    
If I want something from a person I dislike I will act very 
nicely toward that person in order to get it. Q1* 0.59  0.184 
I sometimes try to make people feel guilty so that they 
will do what I want. Q2* 0.807 -0.138  
If I knew that I could never get caught I would be willing 
to steal a million dollars. Q3* 0.621 -0.383 0.317 
If I want something from someone I ask for it directly 
instead of manipulating them into giving it. Q4 0.304 0.396  
I would not cheat a person even if he or she was a real 
"sucker". Q5 -0.173 0.551 0.238 
I would still pay my taxes even if I would not get caught 
for avoiding them. Q6 0.597   
I would be tempted to use counterfeit money if I knew I 
could get away with it. Q7* 0.715 -0.29 0.156 
It is okay to use deception to obtain information superior 
to that of my peers. Q8* 0.79   
Keeping excess funds from my organization is okay if 
my manager does not notice. Q9* 0.826 0.16 -0.106 
Use of deception is fine if it provides me with a 
competitive advantage.  Q10* 0.798 -0.121  
Distributional Fairness     
Having a high level of social status is not very important 
to me. Q11*  0.467 0.159 
Having a lot of money is not especially important to me. Q12 0.348 0.467 -0.148 
I am likely to reject an offer that I feel is unfair even if I 
benefit. Q13* 0.161 0.453 0.176 
Stealing office supplies is justified if my salary is unfair 
and I know I will not be caught. Q14 0.817   
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I would be more likely to embezzle if I believed my 
salary was unfair and know I would not be caught. Q15* 0.795 -0.133  
I am likely to exert more effort on task if my manager 
has shared a portion of the profits with me. Q16 0.108 -0.176 0.596 
I am willing to punish unfair acts even if it is at a 
personal loss. Q17 0.386 0.333  
I am willing to reward acts of kindness even if it is at a 
personal loss. Q18*  0.642 0.216 
I believe that sharing my resources is important if it 
improves common welfare. Q19*  0.553 0.213 
My own needs outweigh those of the common welfare. Q20 0.623   
Intention     
It does not take much to make me anger. Q21 0.683   
I rarely feel anger even when people treat me quite badly. Q22 0.426 0.304 -0.126 
Most people tend to anger more quickly than I do.  Q23 0.102 0.266  
I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment 
rather than on careful thought. Q24 0.79 0.186 -0.138 
I make a lot of mistakes because I do not think before I 
act. Q25 0.808 0.177  
I usually stop myself before doing anything that I might 
later regret. Q26  0.17 0.336 
Sometimes I do things on impulse that turn out later to be 
unwise. Q27 0.648   
I feel that my organization perceives me as untrustworthy 
when controls are explicitly outlined by my manager. Q28 0.819  -0.202 
I believe that direction outlined by my manager is 
intended to improve the overall success of the 
organization and employees alike. Q29   0.334 
I am likely to exert more effort under circumstances 
where directions are explicitly outlined by my manager. Q30 0.273 0.18 0.34 
Conditional     
I am likely to reward a coworker if I feel that they are 
exerting their full effort on a task. Q31  0.198 0.469 
I am likely to punish a coworker if I feel that they are not 
exerting their full effort on a task. Q32 0.597   
I would never accept a bribe even if it were very large.  Q33*  0.558 -0.162 
I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive 
luxury goods Q34 0.418 -0.137 0.226 
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If I were in the role of a superior I would take into 
consideration potential negative feedback from 
subordinates when imposing controls.  Q35*  0.244 0.473 
If I were in the role of a superior I would take into 
consideration potential positive feedback from 
subordinates when allowing greater freedom.  Q36  0.175 0.497 
I am likely to trust individuals that I have had repeated 
positive interactions with. Q37 -0.217  0.607 
I am likely to distrust individuals that I have had repeated 
positive interactions with. Q38  0.184 0.528 
I am more likely to show leniency to individuals whom I 
expect repeated interactions with. Q39  0.524 
I am more likely to give higher levels of effort towards 
individuals whom I expect repeated interaction with. Q40 0.164  0.516 
I am likely to be more honest with individuals who I 
have had extended periods of interaction with, regardless 
of positive or negative experience. Q41 0.162 0.295 0.324 
* Items marked with an asterisk (*) were retained for the final 14-item, 2-factor model presented in Table 7. 
a Conditional questions were items that did not immediately seem to fit directly to one specific dimension, but 
were deemed to be useful for further research for factor loadings. 
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TABLE 6 
CFA Results Using Reduced Scale with Three Factors 
MTurk Survey EFA results: Round 3 
Trust 
Distributional 
Fairness 
Intention 
Alpha 0.909 0.582 0.584 
N=168    
Items       7 7 5 
X² = 413.886, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.757, TLI = 0.719, RMSEA = 0.113 SRMR = 0.095 
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TABLE 7 
CFA Results Using Reduced Scale with Two Factors 
  Trust Distributional Fairness 
Alpha 0.923 0.652 
N=168   
Itemsa        8 6 
Q1   0.654 0.000 
Q2   0.829 0.000 
Q3  0.743 0.000 
Q7   0.810 0.000 
Q8   0.789 0.000 
Q9   0.748 0.000 
Q10  0.809 0.000 
Q15  0.829 0.000 
Q11 0.000 0.379 
Q13   0.000 0.413 
Q18  0.000 0.802 
Q19   0.000 0.659 
Q33  0.000 0.397 
Q35  0.000 0.383 
X² = 305.528, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.807, TLI = 0.768, RMSEA = 0.134 SRMR = 0.087 
a See Table 5 for the detailed wording of each item.   
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TABLE 8 
Fit Measurements for Single Dimension Scales 
 
Measure X² p CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR 
Sensitivity to Trust 151.37 <0.001 0.863 0.808 0.198 0.060 
Sensitivity to Distributional Fairness 149.11 <0.001 0.975 0.959 0.047 0.044 
Variable Definitions:  
Sensitivity to Trust:  
The participants’ average overall sensitivity to reciprocity score average between both the pre-
survey and post-survey deployed for all Items within the 'Trust' dimension. Scale ranges from 
1-5, 1 being very low, 5 being very high. 
Sensitivity to Distributional Fairness:  
Fairness Sensitivity: The participants’ average overall sensitivity to reciprocity score average 
between both the pre-survey and post-survey deployed for all Items within the ‘Distributional 
Fairness’ dimension. Scale ranges from 1-5, 1 being very low, 5 being very high. 
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TABLE 9 
Send and Return Statistics 
Participants   Send % Return % 
N 
Valid 51 51 
Missing 0 0 
Mean  55.29% 24.64% 
Median  50.00% 25.00% 
Std. Deviation   27.74% 20.76% 
Variable Definitions: 
Send %: The percentage of the employee’s initial endowment sent to their manager. 
Employees are initially endowed with $10 
Return %: The percentage of the wealth the manager returns to their employee. This is 
calculated as (manager’s return amount) / (employee transfer * 3). Managers can only 
return an amount between zero and the amount they received from the employee’s initial 
transfer multiplied by 3. 
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TABLE 10  
Average Profit 
Participants   All Employee Manager 
N 
Valid 101 51 50 
Missing 0 0 0 
Mean  $10.66  $9.78  $11.56  
Median  10.00 9.00 11.00 
Std. Deviation   4.43 3.961 4.734 
*All participants’ decisions were made in whole dollar amounts.  
**These amounts do not reflect the additional $5.00 show up fee paid at the end of the 
experiment. 
Variable Definitions: 
All: The wealth retained by the participants designated as the employees at the end of both the 
employee and manager decision rounds. 
Employee: The wealth retained by the participants designated as the employees at the end of both 
the employee and manager decision rounds. 
Manager: The wealth retained by the participants designated as the managers at the end of both the 
employee and manager decision rounds. 
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TABLE 11 
Sensitivity to Reciprocity Scores 
Participants  All Employee Manager 
N 
Valid 101 51 50 
Missing 0 0 0 
Mean  2.91 2.92 2.92 
     
Median  2.89 2.86 2.89 
Std. Deviation   0.365 0.339 0.393 
Variable Definitions: 
All: The average of all sensitivity to reciprocity measurement questions answered by all 
participants during both the pre-survey, and post survey. 
Employee: The average of all sensitivity to reciprocity measurement questions answered by 
employees during both the pre-survey, and post survey. 
Manager: The average of all sensitivity to reciprocity measurement questions answered by 
managers during both the pre-survey, and post survey. 
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TABLE 12 
Employee Sensitivity and Reciprocal Consideration  
    
Sensitivity to 
Reciprocity 
Level of Consideration 
Sensitivity to 
Reciprocity 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 0.073 
 Sig. (2-tailed)  0.613 
  N 51 51 
Level of Consideration 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.073 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .613   
  N 51 51 
Variable Definitions: 
Sensitivity to Reciprocity: The participants’ average overall sensitivity to reciprocity score 
average between both the pre-survey and post-survey deployed. Scale ranges from 1-5, 1 
being very low, 5 being very high. 
Level of consideration: Participants answered a post experimental question gauging how much 
consideration of their paired participants’ actions weighted on their exchange decision. 
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TABLE 13 
Employee Sensitivity and Reciprocal Consideration - Mean T-Test 
Level of Consideration     
Sensitivity to Reciprocity Mean N Std. Deviation 
Low Sensitivity 4.11538 26 1.03255 
High Sensitivity 4.2 25 1.22474 
Total 4.15686 51 1.12022 
Variable Definitions: 
Low/High Sensitivity: Employee's reciprocity was classified as either high or low by a median 
split based on aggregate averages of their Sensitivity to Reciprocity scores. 
Level of consideration: Participants answered a post experimental question gauging how much 
consideration of their paired participants’ actions weighted on their exchange decision. 
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TABLE 14 
Employee Sensitivity and Endowment Sent 
    Sensitivity to Reciprocity Send %  
Sensitivity to Reciprocity Pearson Correlation 1 0.083 
 Sig. (2-tailed)  0.565 
  N 51 51 
Endowment Sent  Pearson Correlation 0.083 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed)               0.565    
  N               51                51 
Variable Definitions: 
Sensitivity to Reciprocity: The participants’ average overall sensitivity to reciprocity score 
average between both the pre-survey and post-survey deployed. Scale ranges from 1-5, 1 
being very low, 5 being very high. 
Send %: The percentage of the employee’s initial endowment sent to their manager. Employees 
are initially endowed with $10. 
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TABLE 15 
Employee Sensitivity and Endowment Sent - Mean T-Test 
Level of Consideration     
Sensitivity to Reciprocity Mean N Std. Deviation 
Low Sensitivity 4.11538 26 0.24536 
High Sensitivity 4.2 25 0.31236 
Total 4.15686 51 0.27738 
Variable Definitions: 
Low/High Sensitivity: Employee's reciprocity was classified as either high or low by a median 
split based on aggregate averages of their Sensitivity to Reciprocity scores. 
Send %: The percentage of the employee’s initial endowment sent to their manager. Employees 
are initially endowed with $10. 
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TABLE 16 
Employee Transfer and Manager Return 
  % Sent by Employee 
% Returned by 
Manager 
% Sent by Employee Pearson Correlation 1 0.724** 
 Sig. (2-tailed)  0.000 
 N 51 51 
% Returned by 
Manager 
Pearson Correlation 0.724** 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000  
 N 51 51 
Variable Definitions: 
Employee %:  The percentage of the employee's initial endowment of $10 transferred to their 
manager. Employee % was classified as either high or low by a median split based on all 
participant's percentages. 
% Returned by Manager: The percentage of endowment returned divided by the amount received 
from the employee's initial transfer. Employee’s initial endowment was $10, any amount 
transferred to the manager was multiplied by 3. 
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TABLE 17 
Descriptive Statistics 
     
  All Manager  
 
 
n 50  
 
Average % Returned 26.13%  
 
Median % Returned 26.67%   
Average Returned (Std. 
Dev) 
0.2063   
  Employee % Low  Employee % High 
  Cell 1  Cell 2 
Manager 
Low 
Reciprocity 
n 9  14 
Average % Returned 
(Std. Dev) 
18.09% (.1290) 
 
41.07% (.2085) 
   
 
 
  Cell 3  Cell 4 
Manager 
High 
Reciprocity 
n 14  14 
Average % Returned 
(Std. Dev) 
7.22% (.1081) 
 
35.99% (.1402) 
Participants assumed the role of either an employee or manager for a hypothetical firm, both of 
whom made a decision to share a portion of their wealth with one another. Each participant 
made one transfer decision. 
Variable Definitions: 
Average % Returned (Std. Dev): The percentage of endowment returned divided by the 
amount received from the employee's initial transfer. Employee’s initial endowment was 
$10, any amount transferred to the manager was multiplied by 3. 
Employee %:  The percentage of the employee's initial endowment of $10 transferred to their 
manager. Employee % was classified as either high or low by a median split based on all 
participant's percentages. 
Manager Reciprocity: Manager's reciprocity was classified as either high or low by a median 
split based on aggregate averages of their Sensitivity to Reciprocity scores. 
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TABLE 18 
Test of Between-Subject Effects of Employee % Transferred and Manager’s Reciprocity on 
Manager’s Average % Returned (n=50) 
 
Source of variance df F p-value, two-tailed 
Intercept 1 133.787 <0.001 
Employee %  1 34.190 <0.001 
Manager Reciprocity 1 3.243 0.078 
Employee % * Manager Reciprocity 1 0.428 0.516 
Error 46   
Variable Definitions:  
Employee %: The percentage of the employee's initial endowment of $10 transferred to their 
manager. Employee % was classified as either high or low by a median split based on all 
participant's percentages 
Manager Reciprocity: Manager's reciprocity was classified as either high or low by a median split 
based on aggregate averages of their Sensitivity to Reciprocity scores. 
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TABLE 19 
Final Scale Correlation Table 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q13 Q15 Q18 Q19 Q33 Q35 avg 
Q1 1 .621** .473** .461** .475** .475** .589** -.063 .005 .519** -.084 -.164* -.138 .150 .638** 
Q2 .621** 1 .583** .621** .667** .576** .746** -.135 .104 .672** -.070 -.044 -.029 -.014 .782** 
Q3 .473** .583** 1 .782** .561** .458** .534** -.144 .071 .634** -.143 -.050 -.416** .050 .670** 
Q7 .461** .621** .782** 1 .577** .618** .565** -.154* .082 .761** -.089 -.069 -.309** .014 .736** 
Q8 .475** .667** .561** .577** 1 .651** .763** -.017 .216** .582** -.001 .018 -.053 -.010 .785** 
Q9 .475** .576** .458** .618** .651** 1 .586** -.008 .200** .694** .081 .092 .123 .004 .796** 
Q10 .589** .746** .534** .565** .763** .586** 1 -.076 .035 .607** -.019 -.057 -.037 .075 .776** 
Q11 -.063 -.135 -.144 -.154* -.017 -.008 -.076 1 .130 -.070 .259** .272** .272** .205** .132 
Q13 .005 .104 .071 .082 .216** .ks200** .035 .130 1 .090 .394** .209** .122 .101 .316** 
Q15 .519** .672** .634** .761** .582** .694** .607** -.070 .090 1 -.068 -.070 -.080 .062 .790** 
Q18 -.084 -.070 -.143 -.089 -.001 .081 -.019 .259** .394** -.068 1 .527** .302** .305** .221** 
Q19 -.164* -.044 -.050 -.069 .018 .092 -.057 .272** .209** -.070 .527** 1 .284** .289** .211** 
Q33 -.138 -.029 -.416** -.309** -.053 .123 -.037 .272** .122 -.080 .302** .284** 1 .087 .092 
Q35 .150 -.014 .050 .014 -.010 .004 .075 .205** .101 .062 .305** .289** .087 1 .247** 
Averag
e 
.638** .782** .670** .736** .785** .796** .776** .132 .316** .790** .221** .211** .092 .247** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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TABLE 19 (continued)  
Item Reference 
Q1 
If I want something from a person I dislike I will act very nicely toward that person in 
order to get it. 
Q2 I sometimes try to make people feel guilty so that they will do what I want. 
Q3 If I knew that I could never get caught I would be willing to steal a million dollars. 
Q7 I would be tempted to use counterfeit money if I knew I could get away with it. 
Q8 It is okay to use deception to obtain information superior to that of my peers. 
Q9 Keeping excess funds from my organization is okay if my manager does not notice. 
Q10 Use of deception is fine if it provides me with a competitive advantage. 
Q11 Having a high level of social status is not very important to me. 
Q13 I am likely to reject an offer that I feel is unfair even if I benefit. 
Q15 
I would be more likely to embezzle if I believed my salary was unfair and know I 
would not be caught. 
Q18 I am willing to reward acts of kindness even if it is at a personal loss. 
Q19 I believe that sharing my resources is important if it improves common welfare. 
Q33 I would never accept a bribe even if it were very large. 
Q35 
If I were in the role of a superior I would take into consideration potential negative 
feedback from subordinates when imposing controls. 
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TABLE 20 
Employee Trust Sensitivity and Reciprocal Consideration  
    
Trust 
Sensitivity 
Level of 
Consideration 
Trust Sensitivity Pearson Correlation 1 0.201 
 Sig. (2-tailed)  0.158 
  N 51 51 
Level of Consideration Pearson Correlation 0.201 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.158   
  N 51 51 
Variable Definitions: 
Trust Sensitivity: The participants’ average overall sensitivity to reciprocity score average 
between both the pre-survey and post-survey deployed for all Items within the 'Trust' 
dimension. Scale ranges from 1-5, 1 being very low, 5 being very high. 
Level of consideration: Participants answered a post experimental question gauging how 
much consideration of their paired participants’ actions weighted on their exchange 
decision. 
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TABLE 21 
Employee Distributional Fairness Sensitivity and Reciprocal Consideration  
    
Distributional 
Fairness 
Sensitivity 
Level of 
Consideration 
Distributional Fairness 
Sensitivity 
Pearson Correlation 1 -0.208 
 Sig. (2-tailed)  0.143 
  N 51 51 
Level of Consideration Pearson Correlation -0.208 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.143   
  N 51 51 
Variable Definitions: 
Distributional Fairness Sensitivity: The participants’ average overall sensitivity to reciprocity 
score average between both the pre-survey and post-survey deployed for all Items within 
the ‘Distributional Fairness’ dimension. Scale ranges from 1-5, 1 being very low, 5 being 
very high. 
Level of consideration: Participants answered a post experimental question gauging how 
much consideration of their paired participants’ actions weighted on their exchange 
decision. 
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TABLE 22 
Employee Trust Sensitivity and Endowment Sent 
    Trust Sensitivity Send %  
Trust Sensitivity Pearson Correlation 1 -0.013 
 Sig. (2-tailed)  0.926 
  N 51 51 
Endowment Sent  Pearson Correlation -0.013 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.926   
  N 51 51 
Variable Definitions: 
Trust Sensitivity: The participants’ average overall sensitivity to reciprocity score average 
between both the pre-survey and post-survey deployed for all Items within the 'Trust' 
dimension. Scale ranges from 1-5, 1 being very low, 5 being very high. 
Endowment Sent: The percentage of the employee’s initial endowment sent to their manager. 
Employees are initially endowed with $10. 
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TABLE 23 
Employee Distributional Fairness Sensitivity and Endowment Sent 
    
Distributional 
Fairness 
Sensitivity 
Send %  
Distributional Fairness 
Sensitivity 
Pearson Correlation 1 0.155 
 Sig. (2-tailed)  0.276 
  N 51 51 
Endowment Sent  Pearson Correlation 0.155 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.276   
  N 51 51 
Variable Definitions: 
Distributional Fairness Sensitivity: The participants’ average overall sensitivity to reciprocity 
score average between both the pre-survey and post-survey deployed for all Items within the 
‘Distributional Fairness’ dimension. Scale ranges from 1-5, 1 being very low, 5 being very 
high. 
Endowment Sent: The percentage of the employee’s initial endowment sent to their manager. 
Employees are initially endowed with $10. 
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TABLE 24 
Test of Between-Subject Effects of Employee % Transferred and Manager’s Trust 
Sensitivity on Manager’s Average % Returned (n=50) 
 
Source of variance df F p-value, two-tailed 
Intercept 1 69.086 <0.001 
Employee %  1 35.430 <0.001 
Trust Sensitivity 1 0.048 0.827 
Employee % * Trust Sensitivity 1 0.389 0.536 
Error 46   
Variable Definitions:  
Employee %: The percentage of the employee's initial endowment of $10 transferred to their 
manager. Employee % was classified as either high or low by a median split based on all 
participant's percentages 
Trust Sensitivity: Manager's trust sensitivity was classified as either high or low by a median 
split based on aggregate averages of their Sensitivity to Trust scores. 
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TABLE 25 
Test of Between-Subject Effects of Employee % Transferred and Manager’s Distributional 
Fairness Sensitivity on Manager’s Average % Returned (n=50) 
 
Source of variance df F p-value, two-tailed 
Intercept 1 67.802 <0.001 
Employee %  1 35.585 <0.001 
Distributional Fairness Sensitivity 1 0.138 0.712 
Employee % * Trust Sensitivity 1 0.003 0.956 
Error 46   
Variable Definitions:  
Employee %: The percentage of the employee's initial endowment of $10 transferred to their 
manager. Employee % was classified as either high or low by a median split based on all 
participant's percentages 
Distributional Fairness Sensitivity: Manager's trust sensitivity was classified as either high or low 
by a median split based on aggregate averages of their Sensitivity to Distributional Fairness 
scores. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
